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ABSTRACT  
Most constitutional challenges in federal court to federal statutes are litigated in the familiar 
pattern of a decision by a single U.S. District Judge, followed by an appeal to a three-judge panel of 
one of the U.S. Court of Appeals, followed by the filing of a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which has discretion to grant or deny the writ.  Sometimes, however, Congress requires a 
separate path for constitutional challenges to particular federal statutes, with the frequent 
challenges to provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, such as in Citizens United v. 
FEC (2010), being a notable example.  These provisions often provide for the convening of a three-
judge district court, usually in the District of Columbia, followed by an ostensibly mandatory 
appeal to the Supreme Court.  They often also permit members of Congress to bring or intervene in 
such actions, and mandate that the federal courts decide the cases in an expeditious manner.  All 
of these characteristics are absent from the typical challenge to federal statutes. 
These atypical jurisdictional provisions in effect establish specialized if ad hoc federal courts to rule 
on constitutional issues.  The causes and consequences of specialized federal constitutional courts 
are an understudied phenomenon in the scholarly literature, a gap filled by this article.  The 
Article first summarizes the history of the three-judge district court, founded to consider all 
constitutional challenges to federal statutes, from its establishment in 1937 to its repeal in 1976. 
It next documents the instances when Congress has subsequently created such courts on a statute-
specific basis, and addresses the rationales advanced in the legislative history, namely, uncertainty 
over a statute’s constitutionality, and the asserted need to promptly resolve that issue.  The Article 
then subjects the partial revival of such courts to critical examination.  It argues that a complex 
and sometimes inconsistent set of reasons, including but not limited to Congressional abdication of 
constitutional deliberation to the judicial branch, explains the ad hoc adoption of these statutes.  
The Article argues that other provisions of these laws, such as mandating venue in the District of 
Columbia or expeditious treatment, are unnecessary.  Finally, it contends that cases litigated before 
these courts have a possibly deleterious impact on the quality of decisions in the Supreme Court.  
The Article concludes that Congress should not pass these statutes and rather permit all 
constitutional litigation to proceed in a uniform manner. 
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The modern Congress sails close to the wind all the time.  Federal 
statutes today often all but acknowledge their questionable constitution-
ality with provisions for accelerated judicial review [and] for standing on 
the part of members of Congress . . . . 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two of the most contentious and controversial decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court in recent years, National Federation of In-
dependent Business v. Sebelius2 and Citizens United v. FEC3 share many 
common characteristics.  Both were 5-4 decisions respectively uphold-
ing and striking down high-profile legislative enactments of Congress 
as a matter of constitutional law, which garnered enormous attention 
during the litigation processes and after the decisions.  Scores of ami-
cus curiae briefs were filed in both cases.  Public debate before and 
after the decisions focused on the predicted and presumed ideologi-
cal voting of the Justices and on the effect of the decisions on the 
economy and the political system, respectively.4 
But the cases differed in important respects:  in how they were lit-
igated and how they reached the Supreme Court.  NFIB v. Sebelius was 
decided as are most constitutional challenges to federal statutes.  Suit 
was brought by private parties before a single judge in a U.S. District 
Court, seeking a ruling that the individual mandate of the Affordable 
Care Act was unconstitutional.  The judge held for the plaintiffs, and 
the government appealed to the regional U.S. Court of Appeals.  Up-
on losing there, the government filed a writ of certiorari in the Su-
preme Court, which the Court granted.5  Parallel litigation by other 
 
 1 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 248 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
 2 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act of 
2010). 
 3 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down provision of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002, which limited independent expenditures by corporations during political cam-
paigns). 
 4 For discussions of the significance of these decisions in the Roberts Court, see, e.g., 
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER:  THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 230–31 
(10th ed. 2014) (discussing the role of amicus briefs in Citizens United); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (2012) (discussing the implications of Citi-
zens United); Jeffrey Rosen, Can the Judicial Branch be a Steward in a Polarized Democracy?, 
DÆDALUS, 25, 25 (2013) (discussing the “ideological lines” of the Roberts Court). 
 5 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Nat'l Fed'n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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parties proceeded in other district courts and courts of appeals, and, 
indeed as the Court noted, those cases generated a split of authority 
on the constitutionality of the Act.6 
Citizens United proceeded on a different litigation path.  In the Bi-
partisan Campaign Finance Act (BCRA), Congress had included a 
provision that mandated that any constitutional challenge to the Act 
be brought before a three-judge district court convened in the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, with a direct appeal of any 
decision to the Supreme Court.7  That provision also granted mem-
bers of Congress standing to bring suit to challenge the Act, and fur-
ther mandated that the federal courts expeditiously resolve the suit.8  
Suit was brought by, among others, the then-minority leader of the 
Senate, and the Act was upheld by a three-judge district court in the 
District of Columbia.  No other litigation was or could be filed, so no 
district—or circuit—split existed.  The Supreme Court, as it usually 
does with ostensibly mandatory appeals, noted probable jurisdiction 
in the case, set it for briefing and oral argument, and decided it on 
the merits.9 
The special jurisdictional provisions of the BCRA are not an iso-
lated phenomenon.  In the past several decades Congress has enacted 
more than a dozen of these provisions (similar or identical to those in 
the BCRA) in other statutes, and considered their adoption in other 
bills introduced but not passed in Congress.10  These provisions in ef-
fect create specialized federal constitutional courts, temporarily con-
vened with borrowed federal judges for the sole purpose of deciding 
the constitutionality of a federal statute.  They raise important issues 
of the law and policy of federal courts.  For example, why does Con-
gress pass these provisions, and do they have virtues (or vices) not 
shared with the normal litigation process?  Are Justice Antonin Scalia 
and Professor Bryan Garner right to conclude that the presence of 
these provisions shows that the underlying statute is of dubious con-
stitutionality?11  Are cases before specialized courts qualitatively de-
 
 6 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2581 (listing other circuits that “have also heard challenges to the 
individual mandate”). 
 7 Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 81, 113–14 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h). 
 8 Id. at § 403(a)–(c), 116 Stat 113–14. 
 9 Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge court) (per curi-
am), appeal dismissed, 552 U.S. 1278 (2008), reargument ordered on appeal after remand, 557 
U.S. 932 (2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 10 Listings of both are found in infra Part III. 
 11 Scalia and Garner list a third characteristic commonly found in these special review provi-
sions, which are “fall-back dispositions should the primary disposition be held unconstitu-
tional.”  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 249.  Fall-back provisions are found in statutes 
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cided differently than constitutional challenges litigated in the nor-
mal process?  There has been relatively little sustained discussion of 
these issues in the scholarly literature,12 and this Article begins to fill 
that gap. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II addresses the use of spe-
cialized courts in the federal system.  Such courts are now prevalent 
for unique areas of subject matter, but have historically been rare for 
constitutional challenges to federal statutes.  In 1937 Congress man-
dated that all such challenges be brought before a three-judge district 
court convened in an appropriate venue in the United States, with a 
direct appeal to the Supreme Court.  Congress abolished the three-
judge court provision in 1976 and repealed the mandatory appeal for 
such cases in 1988.  Part III of the Article documents the revival of 
such provisions in the three decades since.  The legislative history of 
those provisions, such as it is, indicates that some members of Con-
gress were unsure of the constitutionality of the underlying statute.  
Moreover, it also indicates some members of Congress seemed to 
think that special review provisions would lead to an appropriate and 
prompt resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court. 
Part IV of the Article subjects the passage and use of these provi-
sions to critical analysis.  This Part first examines the reasons Con-
gress passes special review provisions.  None of them are particularly 
persuasive reasons to depart from the usual judicial review process, 
and Congress has not added these provisions in a consistent way to 
the entire range of federal statutes potentially subject to constitution-
al attack.  The special review provisions seem emblematic of Congress 
frequently discarding its responsibility to independently consider the 
constitutionality of statutes.  Likewise, a complex and even contradic-
 
both establishing, and not establishing, special review provisions.  While not unrelated to 
the issues addressed here, further discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.  For fur-
ther discussion, see Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 304 (2007) 
(highlighting constitutional and policy concerns regarding the use of fallback provisions 
in legislation). 
 12 The special review provisions are discussed in Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit:  How Law-
makers Spurred on the Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 442–44 (2001); Neal 
Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing:  Raines v. Byrd and the Modern Supreme 
Court’s Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351, 356–57 (1997); 
Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1277, 1311 (2001); Joshua Panas, Note, Out of Control?:  Congressional Power to Shape Ju-
dicial Review of New Legislation, 1 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 151 (2002).  Provisions call-
ing for expeditious court resolution are discussed in William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment:  A 
Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 763 (1997) 
(“[T]he Habeas Reform Act requires a court of appeals to take no more than thirty days 
to dispose of a prisoner’s motion . . . .”). 
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tory set of reasons by supporters and opponents of a particular statute 
may account for these provisions.  For example, opponents of a stat-
ute may support inclusion of the provisions to make it easier and 
quicker for a court to strike it down. 
Part IV next addresses the frequent practice of vesting exclusive 
jurisdiction in the federal courts in the District of Columbia.  The 
specialized jurisdiction of that court in other matters, such as admin-
istrative law, may well be justified, but it does not support similar geo-
graphic specialization for constitutional matters.  Except for some 
unique topics, like patent law, the federal judiciary has long resisted 
geographic specialization, and the use of the District of Columbia 
courts in this instance violates the norm of regional dispersion of the 
jurisdiction of trial courts and courts of appeals. 
Finally, Part IV analyzes the special review provisions from the 
perspective of their effect on Supreme Court decision-making.  This 
Part argues that the Court typically benefits from the percolation of 
issues in different federal courts, and the special review provision de-
prives the Court of information possibly gained from that percola-
tion.  The expeditious review mandate often found in these provi-
sions is unnecessary, since federal judges in the usual process are 
capable of rapid trial and appeals decisions when necessary.  Con-
gress had good reasons to abolish the three-judge district court for 
constitutional attacks on federal statutes in 1976, and these new pro-
visions improperly revive those courts.  Nonetheless, the presence of 
a special review provision is not egregious enough to reverse the pre-
sumption of the constitutionality of a federal statute, as hinted at by 
Justice Scalia and Professor Garner. 
II.  THE FALL OF SPECIALIZED FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 
A. Specialized Judges and Courts in the Federal Judiciary 
The paradigmatic court in the United States federal system is the 
District Court, one of general jurisdiction able to hear virtually all civ-
il and criminal cases.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Supreme 
Court can be similarly characterized as courts of general jurisdiction. 
They are staffed by Article III judges, nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate for a lifetime appointment.  While there 
have been specialized federal courts throughout our history, they 
have been particularly ascendant in the twentieth century.  There are 
now a large number of full-time specialized federal courts and judges, 
covering a variety of administrative law topics or unique subject areas. 
Most are staffed by judges appointed in a variety of ways outside of  
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Article III, lacking the lifetime appointments mandated by that part 
of the Constitution.13 
There are also some specialized courts staffed by Article III judges. 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of Inter-
national Trade are full-time courts consisting of Article III judges.14  
In addition, there are specialized courts convened on a temporary, ad 
hoc basis, staffed by borrowed, generalist Article III judges serving in 
other courts.15  The courts convened to hear constitutional challenges 
to federal statutes, the main focus of this Article, are examples of the 
latter. 
Despite the great variety of specialized courts in the federal system 
(and their counterparts at the state court level), there are common 
rationales for their creation.  These courts are said to possess virtues 
unattainable by generalist courts.  These virtues include that it is 
more efficient to have one court and set of judges work on a particu-
lar topic, since judges familiar with that topic can dispose of cases 
more rapidly and easier than the generalist judges.  A related virtue is 
that the quality of the judicial output is higher, since judges in those 
courts are presumably experts and can be counted on to apply and 
develop the law more coherently on a particular topic.  Still another 
virtue is uniformity.  Generalist courts in different parts of the coun-
try may interpret federal law differently, and if litigation on that topic 
is vested in one court, then the whole country will have the benefit of 
dealing with one and only one judicial resolution of an issue.16 
Yet vices can also attend the creation of specialized courts.  Judi-
cial selection for such courts may become politicized by interest 
groups concerned with their output, in ways usually not found in the 
judicial selection of most generalist courts.  Similarly, specialized 
courts may be captured by a specialized bar for such cases, who may 
interact frequently in and outside of court with the judges.  Constant-
 
 13 For overviews of these specialized federal courts, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 34–41 (6th ed. 2009); 
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1111, 1111–13 (1990). 
 14 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 34–35 (discussing the Court of Appeals for the Feder-
al Circuit and the Court of International Trade). 
 15 Revesz, supra note 13, at 1112 (discussing past and present examples of these courts, in-
cluding the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, the Special Court for the Regional 
Railroad Reorganization Act of 1973, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review). 
 16 For overviews of the benefits of specialized courts, see LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE 
COURTS 32–34 (2011); Revesz, supra note 13, at 1116–17. But see Stefan Voigt, On the Op-
timal Number of Courts, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 49, 50–51 (2012) (discussing the costs of 
having specialized courts and the benefits of multiple court heirarchies). 
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ly dealing with one area of law may become monotonous for the ex-
pert judges, and it is difficult to objectively measure if a specialized 
court is issuing higher quality or more coherent decisions than a 
generalist court dealing with the same cases.17 
B. The Three-Judge District Court as the Forum for Constitutional 
Challenges, 1937–1976 
The advent of the administrative state, the increasing number and 
complexity of federal legislation, and increased caseloads in general 
have driven the specialization of the federal judiciary.18  Yet constitu-
tional litigation has resisted this trend toward specialization.  That is, 
with the exception of the three-judge district court for forty years of 
the twentieth century, summarized below, there has not been a stand-
ing, specialized federal court to deal with constitutional litigation in 
general or the constitutional challenges to federal statutes in particu-
lar. 
Such an institution is not as unusual elsewhere in the world.  
Many other nations have established a standing court for the specific 
purpose of hearing constitutional challenges to legislation of the na-
tional government.  Indeed, there has been an increasing trend to-
ward greater use of this centralized method of judicial review, as 
compared to the typically decentralized path of constitutional litiga-
tion in the United States.19  Support for “constitutional courts” in 
other nations has a long pedigree,20 but they have become more pop-
ular in the post-World War II era due to several factors.  New consti-
tutions were adopted in many countries, often with bills of rights, that 
 
 17 For an overview of these vices, see BAUM, supra note 16, at 35–41; RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM 249–58 (1996); Edward K. Cheng, The 
Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 550–60 (2008); Voigt, supra note 16, at 
51–52. 
 18 For an overview of the increasing specialization of the federal courts in the twentieth cen-
tury, see JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY:  LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 238-69 (2012). 
 19 See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816, 817 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012) (“For rea-
sons to be discussed, the framers of new constitutions have been more attracted to the 
‘centralized model’ of constitutional review, with a specialized [constitutional court] at its 
core, than to the ‘decentralized (or American) model’ of judicial review exercised by the 
judiciary as a whole.”); Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Building Reputation in Constitu-
tional Courts:  Political and Judicial Audiences, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 539, 539 (2011) 
(“Specialized constitutional courts have expanded all over the world in recent decades.”). 
 20 The earliest and most influential supporter in the mid-twentieth century for constitution-
al courts was Austrian legal theorist Hans Kelsen.  See Sweet, supra note 19, at 817–19 
(“The modern constitutional court, however, is largely the invention of Hans Kelsen.”). 
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benefited from a judicial enforcement mechanism.  A stand-alone 
constitutional court could be easily added to existing judicial struc-
tures.  Many countries were experimenting for the first time with 
American-style judicial review, and constitutional courts dedicated to 
that purpose were thought appropriate for the advancement and le-
gitimacy of that project.21 
But for the most part the United States has been reticent to estab-
lish a standing constitutional court.  Part of the explanation is surely 
the relatively recent practice, in historical terms, of the Supreme 
Court regularly considering the constitutionality of federal statutes.  
While that power of course traces back over two centuries to Marbury 
v. Madison,22 for much of American history the Supreme Court has 
not been hearing constitutional challenges to, much less stricken 
down, congressional legislation.  During most of the nineteenth cen-
tury the Court rarely was asked to strike down, and rarely did strike 
down, federal legislation as unconstitutional.  That reticence eroded 
in the late nineteenth century, and the erosion has continued to 
greater or lesser degrees since then.23  But the present, three-tier 
structure of the generalist Article III courts was in place by 1891,24 
and it appears there was little if any discussion after that point about 
creating specialized constitutional courts in the federal system. 
That discussion revived in the 1930s during the Court’s storied 
battle with President Franklin Roosevelt regarding the constitutional-
ity of several important pieces of New Deal legislation.  The Presi-
dent’s “court-packing” proposal had been largely framed in adminis-
trative terms, to enable the Supreme Court and the federal court 
system to operate in a more efficient manner.  The proposal to pack 
 
 21 See id. at 819–20 (discussing constitutional framers from various countries that model 
their systems after those found in other countries).  One recent study has concluded that 
the adoption of such courts is best explained by domestic political considerations, name-
ly, as a method where competitive political parties seek to safeguard their future interests.  
They do this in the belief that the judiciary may protect constitutional values even when a 
particular party lacks, at least periodically, the political power to do so.  See generally Tom 
Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?, 30 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 587 (2014). 
 22 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 23 For overviews and data on the Supreme Court deciding constitutional challenges to con-
gressional legislation, see LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM:  DATA, 
DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 188–92 (5th ed. 2012) (publishing a table of “Supreme 
Court Decisions Holding Acts of Congress Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part, 1789–
2009 Terms”); see generally, LINDA KAMP KEITH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF CONGRESS (2008). 
 24 This was as a result of the Evarts Act of 1891, creating the regional U.S. Courts of Appeals.  
The present structure of regional district courts and appellate courts continued relatively 
unchanged since then.  FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 37–38. 
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the Court by adding Justices spectacularly failed, but a relatively mi-
nor part of that package did pass Congress in 1937.  It required that 
all constitutional challenges be filed before a three-judge district 
court with venue over the action.25 The judges of that court consisted 
of the district judge before whom the case was originally filed, sup-
plemented by at least one court of appeals judge, and typically anoth-
er district judge, the latter two appointed by the Chief Judge of the 
circuit within which the suit was brought.  A direct appeal was possi-
ble to the Supreme Court; the Court ostensibly had to hear the ap-
peal, as it was different from the discretionary certiorari jurisdiction 
which covered almost all of the Court’s other cases. 
The three-judge court concept was borrowed virtually unchanged 
from the three-judge district court Congress established in 1910 to 
hear constitutional challenges to, and particularly, to seek injunctive 
relief against, state statutes.  The 1910 law was a reaction to the then-
controversial Court decision in 1908 in Ex parte Young,26 in which the 
Lochner Era Court struck down state Progressive Era legislation regu-
lating railroad rates.  What was especially noteworthy about Ex parte 
Young was that the Court permitted the plaintiff railroad companies 
to proactively seek injunctive relief in federal court, rather than wait 
to raise the constitutional issue as a defense to an enforcement action 
in state court.27  In reaction, Congress legislatively mandated that all 
such actions, seeking injunctive relief on the asserted basis of the un-
constitutionality of a state statute, be brought before a specially con-
vened three-judge district court, with a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court.28  Supporters in Congress advanced several rationales for this 
court to hear such matters.  The striking down of a state statute on 
these grounds was considered so significant that one federal judge, 
standing alone, should not possess the power to do so. Instead, any 
such decision would be better discussed and decided by three federal 
judges, at least one of whom was a court of appeals judge, and per-
haps even better received by the interested public.  Whatever the de-
cision of the three-judge district court, supporters also thought that a 
prompt resolution of an important matter like the legality of a state 
statute was necessary, and one way to ensure that would be to bypass 
 
 25 Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, 50 Stat. 752 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2282) (repealed 1976). 
 26 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 27 For a discussion of the jurisprudential significance of and the early congressional reaction 
to Ex parte Young, see Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the 
Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 104–18 (2008). 
 28 Act of June 19, 1910, § 266, 36 Stat. 1100 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281) (repealed 1976). 
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the normal appeal to a court of appeals, and provide a direct path to 
the Supreme Court.29 
In the years leading up to 1937, many federal laws challenged on 
constitutional grounds were the subject of injunctions entered by 
federal judges in lower courts, most on their way to review by the Su-
preme Court.  As early as 1935 some members of Congress, “irri-
tat[ed]”30 by how some federal judges, sitting alone, had enjoined en-
forcement of what were perceived to be important federal statutes, 
supported proposals to provide for prompt, direct appeals of such 
decisions to the Supreme Court.  These ideas led to the legislation in 
1937, whose supporters argued that litigation attacking federal stat-
utes should be of “equal dignity” to other suits covered by the three-
judge district court and share in the presumed benefits of that 
court.31 
Whatever the benefits of the three-judge district court to litigants, 
particularly plaintiffs,32 many other influential observers eventually 
concluded that they were outweighed by the administrative burdens 
of the court. 33  The criticisms were very similar for both aspects of the 
 
 29 For detailed discussion of the legislative background and intent of the 1910 Act, see So-
limine, supra note 27, at 111–18. 
 30 Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 
1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REV. 577, 617 (1938).  There was a  “voluminous outpouring” 
of federal district court decisions holding various provisions of New Deal legislation un-
constitutional and enjoining their application.  Id. at 611.  One of the leading Congres-
sional critics of these decisions was then-Senator Hugo Black, who introduced legislation 
in 1935 providing for direct appeals from district court decisions, though not for the con-
vening of a three-judge district court.  Id. at 612–13.  The legislation proposed by Senator 
Black did not pass.  Id. at 613. 
 31 David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1, 11 (1964). For further discussion of the legislative history of the 1937 Act, see CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 17A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4234 at 194–95 (3d ed. 
2007); Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 30, at 610–19; Solimine, supra note 27, at 124–25; 
Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation:  A Procedural Anachro-
nism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 561–63 (1960). 
 32 For example, plaintiffs in civil rights cases in the 1950s and 1960s saw benefits in litigating 
cases before the court, particularly those brought in southern states.  In many instances, 
they thought, they were more likely to prevail before three judges than before a possibly 
recalcitrant single judge.  And they preferred a relatively quick appeal to what was per-
ceived as a friendly tribunal (the Warren Court), as compared to the normal and longer 
appeals process to a less certain fate in one of the courts of appeals.  See Solimine, supra 
note 27, at 125–31 (discussing “[t]he Three-Judge District Court and the Civil Rights 
Movement”). 
 33 Concern over the administrative burdens of the court began to be expressed soon after its 
jurisdiction was extended to attacks on federal statutes and only intensified later.  See e.g., 
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941) (noting that the three-judge district 
court “entails a serious drain upon the federal judieial system particularly in regions 
where, despite modern facilities, distance still plays an important part in the effective ad-
ministration of  justice”).  
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court, as it pertained to attacks on federal and state statutes.  One 
criticism was the administrative burdens placed on the lower courts. 
Most cases then and now are litigated in the first instance before a 
single district judge.  Assembling three federal judges to sit as a trial 
court was an awkward fit on several grounds.  The busy schedules of 
three otherwise separately-working judges had to be reconciled; trial 
judges and at least one appeals judge, used to working separately, had 
to work together; and three persons rather than just one had to per-
form the work typically done by one trial judge.34 
Another criticism concerned the caseload of the Supreme Court.  
Normally the Court manages its discretionary docket through the writ 
of certiorari, but direct appeals bypassed this process and ostensibly 
required the Court to decide all such appeals on the merits.  It de-
prived the Court of the possible benefit of consideration and sharp-
ening of issues by at least one, and sometimes more than one, court 
of appeals, as with all other cases.  Nor was a direct appeal necessary 
for rapid disposition, critics argued, since experience showed that 
when necessary district and appellate judges could expeditiously de-
cide cases and appeals.  The Court ameliorated some of these prob-
lems by often summarily affirming (or occasionally reversing) such 
appeals, as opposed to setting them for a full briefing and argument, 
followed by a full opinion. But even with this safety valve, the Court 
was deciding scores of appeals from three-judge district courts in the 
1960s and 1970s, sometimes up to a third of all decisions rendered in 
a Term.35 
By that time, prominent academic observers,36 think tanks,37 and 
specially appointed committees38 were calling for the abolition of the 
 
 34 E.g., Currie, supra note 31, at 2, 74 (recognizing as a “prejudice” against provisions provid-
ing for three-judge district courts and direct appeal to the Supreme Court that 
“[c]onsuming the energies of three judges to conduct one trial is prima facie an egre-
gious waste of resources”); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON 
THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 598-99 (1973) 
[hereinafter FREUND REPORT]. 
 35 E.g., AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 53, 
318–25 (1969) [hereinafter ALI STUDY] (citing some cases that addressed three-judge 
courts); FREUND REPORT, supra note 34, at 599–602.  One problem raised by the summary 
disposition practice was how much precedential weight they should be given by the Court 
itself and lower courts.  To this day the Court itself has been unclear on this matter.  See 
Solimine, supra note 27, at 135. 
 36 For example, Professor David Currie of the University of Chicago.  See supra note 31. 
 37 For example, the American Law Institute.  See supra note 35. 
 38 For example, the committee assembled under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center, 
chaired by Harvard Law Professor Paul Freund, and including Professors Alexander Bick-
el (Yale Law School) and Charles Alan Wright (University of Texas Law School), among 
others.  See supra, note 34. 
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thee-judge district court, as least as it pertained to constitutional at-
tacks on federal statutes.  This criticism was joined by prominent fed-
eral judges, not least of whom was Chief Justice Warren Burger.39  The 
Judiciary Committees in both houses of Congress listened to their 
pleas, held hearings and passed bills40 culminating in legislation en-
acted in 1976,41 which abolished the court as it pertained to attacks 
on federal statutes.  The legislation significantly curtailed its usage in 
attacks on state practices, as it was only to be convened for reappor-
tionment cases.42  The 1937 experiment had come to end, and few 
seemed to mourn its passing.43 
 
 39 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary—1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 
1053 (1972) (“We should totally eliminate the three-judge district courts that now disrupt 
district and circuit judges' work.”). 
 40 For a detailed summary and examination of the consideration and passage of the 1976 
Act, see WRIGHT, supra note 31, at § 4235; Solimine, supra note 27, at 134–48. 
 41 Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 
2284). 
 42 The critics of the three-judge district had allowed that it still might be appropriate for 
particularly controversial cases raising federalism issues, and reapportionment cases were 
listed as an example.  See Solimine, supra note 27, at 137–38 (discussing views of Professor 
Currie and of the ALI Report).  That proposed exception was later considered by the Ju-
diciary Committees, and it found its way into the final legislation.  Id. at 144 (“The reports 
of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees make clear that the drafters of those re-
ports adopted almost all the arguments of the critics of the three-judge district court.”).  
The principal reason for that exception was the then-controversial nature of reappor-
tionment cases in federal court, initiated by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  Id. at 144–
45 (“Also, reapportionment cases were, at the time, particularly controversial. Baker v. 
Carr and legislative efforts to restrict it were probably fresh in the minds of many mem-
bers of Congress.”).  For discussions of litigation in three-judge district courts in reappor-
tionment and related cases since 1976, see Michael E. Solimine, Congress, the Solicitor Gen-
eral, and the Path of Reapportionment Litigation, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1109, 1141–47 
(2012) [hereinafter Solimine, Reapportionment]; Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge Dis-
trict Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79 (1996) [hereinafter Soli-
mine, Three-Judge District Court]; see also Lisa Marshall Manheim, Redistricting Litigation and 
the Delegation of Democratic Design, 93 B.U. L. REV. 563 (2013). 
 43 The remnant of the direct review statute, insofar as it did not apply to the remaining 
three-judge district court jurisdiction, was repealed in 1988.  See Act of June 27, 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662. For a discussion of this, see 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 31, at § 4040. While proposals to repeal the direct review statute were discussed at 
the same time as proposals to repeal the three-judge district court, the latter preceded 
the former by twelve years.  The principal reason for the delay was that early in the 
Reagan Administration, proposals to repeal the direct review statute were coupled with 
amendments to deprive the Supreme Court of any review over cases involving certain 
controversial issues, such as school prayer.  Such amendments were themselves so contro-
versial that support for a simple repeal suffered.  Eventually those amendments were 
dropped and a straightforward repeal passed.  See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause 
as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 970–76 (2013) (discussing the debates 
over “the Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction” and their results). 
128 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
III.  THE RISE OF STATUTES WITH SPECIALIZED CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW PROVISIONS 
A.  The New Provisions 
Even before the 1976 repeal of the three-judge district court, 
Congress was considering and enacting legislation that replicated, in 
whole or in part, the repealed provision in the context of particular 
statutes.  And that process continued for an appreciable number of 
statutes after the 1976 repeal.  This Part of the Article will first pro-
vide an overview of those statutes and then summarize the legislative 
history of the provisions. 
One category of these statutes is those concerning the regulation 
of fund-raising by various entities for political campaigns for federal 
office.  In the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign 
Act (FECA), Congress provided that the “national committee of any 
political party,” or “any individual eligible to vote in any election for 
the office of the President,” could file suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of the amendments in an appropriate federal district court.44  
The court was to “immediately” certify all constitutional questions to 
the relevant court of appeals, which was directed to hear the appeal 
en banc.45  That decision would be reviewed on direct appeal in the 
Supreme Court.  The legislation further admonished the federal 
courts to hear and decide the cases expeditiously.46  Senator James 
Buckley, a vocal opponent of the amendments, promptly brought suit 
in the district court for the District of Columbia, and the indicated 
provisions were utilized in the litigation that culminated in the land-
mark case of Buckley v. Valeo.47 
 
 44 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 315(a), 88 
Stat. 1285 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.  An earlier, related law, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971, estab-
lished an exclusive mechanism for the FEC and others to “implement or construe” the 
law.  Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 563, 570 (1971) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 
9011 (b)(1)).  Suit would be brought before a three-judge district court, with a direct ap-
peal to the Supreme Court.  Id. (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(2)).  The 
statutory text did not specifically refer to a constitutional challenge, but such a challenge 
was resolved through litigation under that provision.  See Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 
F. Supp. 489, 490, 494 (D.D.C. 1980) (presiding as a three-judge court and analyzing the 
constitutionality of the limits imposed by the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 
1971), aff’d, 455 U.S. 129 (1982). 
 47 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).  For further discussion of the passage of the amendments 
and the procedural aspects of the Buckley v. Valeo case, see Michael E. Solimine, Institu-
tional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 
OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 771, 775 (2007) [hereinafter Solimine, Institutional].  
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A similar but not identical pattern is found in the special review 
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002,48 
mentioned at the outset of this Article, also known as the McCain-
Feingold law.  Section 403 of the BCRA provides that any constitu-
tional challenge must be brought before a three-judge district court 
in the District of Columbia, with a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court, and in an expedited manner.49  It further provided that mem-
bers of Congress had standing to challenge the law in court, or could 
intervene in similar litigation brought by others.50  Intervention was 
unnecessary, as then-Minority Leader Senator Mitch McConnell and 
other members of Congress brought suit the day after the President 
signed the BCRA, starting the process that culminated in the Su-
preme Court’s decision of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.51  
These provisions have also been used by other plaintiffs challenging 
other aspects of the BCRA, which have resulted in additional cases lit-
igated in the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court,52 includ-
ing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.53 
A second set of statutes do not fall into any particular subject area, 
but can be categorized as legislation that at least some members of 
Congress deemed important and would benefit from constitutional 
challenges being litigated in the pattern found in the BCRA:  exclu-
sive review by a single judge or a three-district court, usually in the 
 
 48 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).  The BCRA thus amended the FECA, but estab-
lished a different review mechanism for constitutional questions.  Constitutional chal-
lenges to provisions of FECA remain under the procedure passed in 1974.  See Wagner v. 
FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1010–11, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (discussing the ways in 
which constitutional challenges to FECA must be reviewed). 
 49 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 403(a).  
 50 Id. at § 403(b). 
 51 540 U.S. 93 (2003), aff’g in part, rev’g in part, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (three-
judge court) (per curiam).  For an overview of the procedural aspects of McConnell, see 
Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 771–72, 776. 
 52 See, e.g., Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006), vacating 2004 WL 
3622736 (D.D.C. 2004) (three-judge court); FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 
449 (2007), aff’g 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (three-judge court); Davis v. FEC, 554 
U.S. 724 (2008), rev’g 501 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2007) (three-judge court); Republican 
Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010), aff’g 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(three-judge court); Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012), aff’g 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 
(D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court)); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), rev’g 893 
F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge court); James v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1806 (2014) 
(per curiam), vacating and remanding 914 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge court); 
see also Nicholas Confessore, G.O.P. Sues for a Loophole to Raise Unlimited Money from Indi-
viduals, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/us/politics/
gop-sues-in-effort-to-raise-unlimited-cash-from-individuals.html?_r=0 (discussing the latest 
suit against the BCRA, Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC). 
 53 558 U.S. 310 (2010). For the procedural history of the decision, see supra note 9. 
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District of Columbia, followed by direct review in the Supreme 
Court.54  These statutes include the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act of 1985,55 the Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Decency Act of 1992,56 the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996,57 the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996,58 the Line Item Veto Act of 1996,59 and the census reform leg-
islation passed in 1998.60  Two other statutes similarly provided that a 
constitutional challenge must be brought before a single district 
judge in a district with appropriate venue, with a direct appeal and 
certiorari jurisdiction, respectively, to the Supreme Court:  the Flag 
Protection Act of 1989,61 and the REAL ID Act of 2005.62 
 
 54 These statutes were assembled in two ways, by consulting secondary sources which list ex-
amples of such laws, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 248–29 nn. 7–9, and conduct-
ing a computer search of the text of statutes and bills for the past six Congresses found at 
www.thomas.gov, now www.congress.gov, for the words “constitutional” or “constitutional-
ity.”  I cannot guarantee that I have found every law that contains a special provision for 
constitutional challenges, but I believe I account for many if not most of them. 
 55 Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 274(a)(5), 99 Stat. 1037, 1098 (1985), applied in Bowsher v. Synar, 
478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (holding the law unconstitutional), aff’g Synar v. United States, 
626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) (three-judge court). 
 56 Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 23, 106 Stat. 1460, 1500, applied in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 622 (1994) (remanding case for further proceedings), vacating 819 F. Supp. 
32 (D.D.C. 1993) (three-judge court), and Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 
225 (1997) (holding “must-carry” provisions constitutional), aff’g 910 F. Supp. 734 
(D.D.C. 1995) (three-judge court). 
 57 Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561, 110 Stat. 133, 142, applied in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 
(1997) (holding law that limited indecent material on internet unconstitutional), aff’g 
929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)(three-judge court). 
 58 Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561(a), 110 Stat. 56, 142, applied in United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (holding that part of the law is unconstitutional as vi-
olating First Amendment), aff’g 30 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D.Del. 1998) (three-judge court). 
 59 Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 3, 110 Stat. 1200, 1211 (1996), applied in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 
811, 830 (1997) (establishing members of Congress did not have standing to challenge 
law), vacating 956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997), and Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 
417, 449 (1998) (holding line-item veto unconstitutional as violation of separation of 
powers), aff’g 985 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 60 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 209(e), 111 Stat. 2240, 2480, applied in 
Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 320 (1999) (challeng-
ing constitutionality of sampling to generate census data since statute was interpreted not 
to provide for sampling), aff’g Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Va. 1998) 
(three-judge court) and U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 11 F. 
Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 1998) (three-judge court). 
 61 Pub. L. No. 101-131, § 3, 103 Stat. 777, applied in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 
312 (1990) (holding law unconstitutional), aff’g 731 F. Supp. 1123 (D.D.C. 1990) and 
United States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash. 1990). 
 62 Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 311, construed in Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. 
Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D.D.C. 2007) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss and reject-
ing the constitutional challenge), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 918 (2008). 
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A third set of statutes can be collectively labeled as “Saxbe Fix” 
laws.  The term comes from controversy surrounding President Nix-
on’s nomination in 1973 of Senator William Saxbe to serve as Attor-
ney General.  Since Saxbe served in Congress while legislation passed 
to increase the salary or benefits of the office to which he would be 
appointed, it was argued that the appointment would violate the ob-
scure Emoluments Clause of the Constitution.63  The issue has come 
up numerous times in American history, and the response has ranged 
from nothing, to statutes which retroactively reduce any salary or 
benefits flowing to the office of the new appointee, as occurred with 
Attorney General Saxbe.64  Some have argued, however, that the ret-
roactive fix does not cure an Emoluments Clause violation, and on at 
least five occasions the legislation has provided a special review pro-
cess for an anticipated constitutional attack.  Four of those laws re-
quired that such a suit be brought before a three-judge district court 
in the District of Columbia, with a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court.65  At least one other law set up the same process, but with no 
requirement that it be brought in the District of Columbia.66 
Finally, it is worth noting that in recent years bills have been in-
troduced in Congress which, in a variety of circumstances, establish 
special review mechanisms for anticipated constitutional challenges 
to the law, if enacted.67  Indeed, on one recent occasion the lack of 
 
 63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.2. 
 64 For a history of the controversy, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitu-
tional?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 907 (1994). 
 65 For the appointment of Sen. Hillary Clinton to Secretary of State, see Pub. L. No. 110-
455, 122 Stat. 5036 (2008), applied in Rodearmel v. Clinton, 666 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125 
(D.D.C. 2009) (three-judge court) (dismissing case for lack of standing), appeal dismissed, 
130 S. Ct. 3384 (2010).  For the appointment of Sen. Ken Salazar to the Secretary of the 
Interior, see Pub. L. No. 111-1, 123 Stat. 3 (2009).  For the appointment of Sen. Lloyd 
Bentsen to Secretary of the Treasury, see Pub. L. No. 103-2, 107 Stat. 4 (1993).  For the 
appointment of Senator William Saxbe to Attorney General, see Pub. L. No. 93-178, 87 
Stat. 697 (1973). 
 66 Act of Oct.12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 101(c), 93 Stat. 656, 657–58, applied in McClure 
v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D. Idaho 1981) (three-judge court) (holding provision 
granting standing to plaintiff Senator unconstitutional and thus not reaching merits), 
aff’d, McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981).  This provision was the result of opposi-
tion by Senator James McClure, Republican of Idaho, to the appointment of Democratic 
Representative Abner Mikva of Illinois to the D.C. Circuit.  See Solimine, Three-Judge Dis-
trict Court, supra note 42, at 133 n. 284 (discussing this case). 
 67 See, e.g., District of Columbia Equal Representation Act of 2013, H.R. 362, 113th Cong. § 7 
(2013) (requiring constitutional challenge to be in the district court for the District of 
Columbia with direct appeal on an expedited basis to the Supreme Court); Main Street 
Fairness Act, S. 1452, 112th Cong. § 8 (2011) (requiring a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court from the district court, except without a requirement that such a suit be only 
brought in the District of Columbia); District of Columbia Voting Rights Act of 2009, S. 
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such a provision in a proposed law was a subject of controversy on the 
floor of Congress.  In response to the Citizens United decision, Demo-
crats introduced the DISCLOSE Act, which among other things 
would have strengthened disclosure requirements for campaign con-
tributions.68  It also provided that any constitutional challenge be filed 
in the district court for the District of Columbia, with an appeal to a 
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, combined with permission for members of Congress to file 
such a suit and a mandate that the federal courts expeditiously re-
solve the case.69  Republican opponents in the House of Representa-
tives denounced the omission of a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court, like that found in the BCRA.  The omission, the opponents 
charged, was “an effort to ensure that the Supreme Court would not 
interpret the law before the 2010 elections.”70  The bill passed the 
House but ultimately failed in the Senate. 
B.  Congressional Rationales 
Several common themes are apparent in the passage of almost all 
of the special review provisions.  One characteristic is that the provi-
sions were rarely the subject of extensive (or any) discussion during 
the typically early stages of the legislative process (i.e., in committee 
hearings or reports), and instead were added as late amendments, of-
ten on the floor of Congress before a final vote.71  The provisions 
were often added to respond to eleventh-hour arguments that the 
underlying laws were constitutionally suspect.72 
 
160, 111th Cong. § 8(a) (2009) (requiring any constitutional challenge to be brought in a 
three-judge district court in the District of Columbia, with a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court); Fair Elections Now Act, H.R. 7022, 110th Cong. § 401 (2008) (appeal of “any 
court ruling” on a constitutional challenge to the law “may be taken directly to the Su-
preme Court”); Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, S. 852, 109th Cong. § 
305(c)(1) (2005) (requiring any constitutional challenge to be brought in a three-judge 
district court in the District of Columbia, with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court); Dis-
trict of Columbia Student Opportunity Scholarship Act of 2002, S. 2866 107th Cong. § 12 
(2002) (determining constitutional challenge would be in the district court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, on an expedited basis with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court)  
 68 Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act, H.R. 5175, 
111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter DISCLOSE Act]. 
 69 Id. at § 401(a)(1)-(3). 
 70 Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 433, 
476. 
 71 See Devins, supra note 12, at 442–43 (giving examples of statutes in which “the expedited 
review provision was not part of the original bill”). 
 72 See id. (“[I]nstead, after constitutional objections were raised, Congress—rather than set-
tle the issue itself—decided that it was best to hand the matter off to the Supreme 
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To the extent the official record reveals putative motivations for 
the special review provisions, they fall into two related categories.  
First, there is a desire for swift resolution of any constitutional chal-
lenges in federal court to the underlying substantive law, and the 
concern that the constitutionality of the law is not clear.  This goal is 
ostensibly advanced by the truncated two-step process, typically leav-
ing out an appeal from the district court to the courts of appeals, 
coupled with mandates that the Supreme Court hear an appeal, and 
that all of the federal judges expeditiously resolve the case.  Members 
of Congress indicated that there was a need for swift resolution of any 
court challenges, due to upcoming elections, the cost of implement-
ing the law, or similar reasons.73 
The second ground is concern over the constitutionality of the 
law.  This is related but separate from the desire to see that a consti-
tutional litigation be promptly resolved.  Some members of Congress 
might be certain that the law is constitutional, but nonetheless con-
cede that not everyone agrees and wish that any litigation by constitu-
tional doubters be quickly resolved against the plaintiffs.  That said, 
the legislative history of the provisions in question indicates concerns 
of constitutional uncertainty, rather than doubts of lawfulness or firm 
convictions that the underlying law is constitutional.  According to 
most of these members of Congress, the conventional way to resolve 
the constitutional question is to make it quicker and easier for federal 
courts to resolve the issue.74 
 
Court.”); Panas, supra note 12, at 170–71 (illustrating how this happened in the Line Item 
Veto Act). 
 73 Consider the following examples.  On the 1974 Amendments to FECA, supra note 46, see 
Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 772 (“Given their regulation of campaign finance 
for presidential and other federal office elections, the drafters thought that a prompt 
resolution of any legal challenge to these important statutes was desirable.”); Panas, supra 
note 12, at 163–66 (discussing various rationales for expedited review provisions); Wag-
ner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1013–15 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (discussing the legisla-
tive purpose of FECA).  On the costs of implementing the census sampling law in 1998, 
see supra note 60 and 143 CONG. REC. H8227 (1997) (statement by Rep. Rogers).  On the 
need for prompt resolution of challenges to the changes in the budget procedures found 
in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, supra note 55, see 
H.R. REP. NO. 99–433, at 99–100 (1985) (Conf. Rep.); 131 CONG. REC. H9598 (daily ed. 
Nov. 1, 1985) (statement of Rep. Duncan discussing the Act).  And on the need to 
promptly determine if the President could exercise the powers granted him by the Line 
Item Veto Act, supra note 59, see 141 CONG. REC. S4243–44 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) 
(statements of Sens. Simon, Exon, and McCain); Devins & Fitts, supra note 12, at 357–58 
(explaining that “congressional sponsors understood that the President would not have 
an opportunity to make use of his item veto power until some time after the Supreme 
Court's anticipated decision”). 
 74 Consider the following examples.  On the Balanced Budget and Deficit Control Act of 
1985, supra note 55, see 131 CONG. REC. H29050 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1985) (statement of 
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There was not necessarily unanimous support for the provisions. 
On several occasions the record reveals that some members opposed 
the special review provisions or were skeptical of their efficacy.  The 
reasons included concerns that the provisions in effect called for the 
federal courts to render advisory opinions,75 or that the constitutional 
status of the underlying statute was not important enough to be the 
subject of special treatment, as compared to other laws.76 
IV.  THE DUBIOUS REVIVAL OF SPECIALIZED FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS 
Certain aspects of the new special constitutional courts are them-
selves, surely constitutional.  Congress has broad power to regulate 
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and of the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court.77  Replacing the usual three-step pro-
cess for constitutional litigation with a different two-step process is 
well within Congress’ discretion.  More questionable but probably 
still valid are the provisions that instruct the federal courts to decide 
the constitutional challenges in an expeditious manner.  One branch 
of government telling another how to conduct its business raises sep-
aration of powers concerns.  But most of the special review provisions 
do not specify precise time periods within which federal courts must 
act, and the language seems to be merely a recommendation. 78  On 
that understanding, the expediting language does not raise serious 
constitutional concerns,79 and the Supreme Court seems little trou-
 
Rep. Lott).  On the Communications Decency Act, supra note 57, see 142 CONG REC. 
H1166 (1996) (statement of Rep. Berman).  On the Line Item Veto, supra note 59, see 
Devins, supra note 12, at 443 & n. 39 (discussing constitutional doubts strenuously raised 
by Sen. Byrd); Panas, supra note 12, at 170–71 (same). 
 75 For example, on the Flag Protection Act, supra note 61, see 135 CONG. REC. S23161 (daily 
ed. Oct. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (“I am not happy with expedited review—
because it means that the Supreme Court will decide an important issue with no factual 
context outside of a single case.”); on the census reform law, supra note 60, see 143 
CONG. REC. H8227 (1997) (statement of Rep. Frank) (stating that the expedited review 
provision improperly asks the Supreme Court to render an advisory opinion). 
 76 For example, on the Flag Protection Act, supra note 61, see 135 CONG. REC. S23137 (Oct. 
4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“Is the issue important enough to warrant special 
treatment?  Then, I suppose, one may argue that the Congress should seriously consider 
granting expedited review to cases arising from other worthy contexts such as civil rights, 
abortion, religious liberty, death penalty.”). 
 77 FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 274–306. 
 78 Ryan, supra note 12, at 802–804 
 79 See id. at 799–810 (discussing constitutional considerations with regard to express and 
precise statutory time limits); Panas, supra note 12, at 162–63 (discussing the constitu-
tionality of expediting mandates). 
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bled when it acknowledges in opinions that it is expediting treatment 
of a particular case.80 
More problematic are other aspects of the special review provi-
sions.  Granting members of Congress standing to bring a constitu-
tional challenge is, at least on its face, of doubtful validity.  This was 
made clear in Raines v. Byrd,81 in where the Court considered the spe-
cial review provision of the Line Item Veto Act.  As permitted by the 
Act, members of Congress, in their individual capacity, brought the 
suit, and the Court held that they lacked standing.82  Lower courts 
had long struggled with the issue of whether members of Congress 
possessed standing to challenge the validity of statutes or other gov-
ernmental action, simply by virtue of their status as legislators, and 
the Court had itself not been clear on the issue.83  The Court in Raines 
did not purport to definitively resolve the issue, but it did hold that 
the plaintiffs lacked an injury necessary to satisfy standing.  The Pres-
ident had not yet exercised a veto under the Act, so the law at that 
stage did not affect their votes on appropriation bills, or the lawmak-
ing process in general.84  Raines thus cast great doubt on an unquali-
fied right of Congress to statutorily grant standing to its own mem-
bers simply by virtue of their holding office.85  Instead, the Court 
seemed to permit such standing in those narrower instances where 
legislative votes had been nullified in some way by the subsequent 
governmental action which lawmakers were now challenging.86 
 
 80 E.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (“In obedience to the statutory 
direction to allow a direct, expedited appeal to this Court . . . we promptly noted proba-
ble jurisdiction and expedited review . . . .”); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 817–18 (1997) 
(“We established an expedited briefing schedule . . . .”). 
 81 521 U.S. 811 (1997).  
 82 Id. at 814-18 
 83 For an overview, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 122–23. 
 84 Raines, 521 U.S. at 824–28 (holding that precedent and “historical practice” work against 
the appellees in this case). 
 85 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 123; Panas, supra note 12, at 159 (explaining the hold-
ing of Raines with regard to congressional standing). 
 86 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 (comparing this case to Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437 
(1939), which found that senators did have standing to challenge the bill at issue).  The 
Court’s recent decision in United States v. Windsor, 113 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), offered little 
clarification of this issue.  There the President had declined to defend § 3 of the Defense 
of Marriage Act (DOMA), codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, against a constitutional challenge 
brought by a private party, but still enforced the law.  Windsor, 113 S. Ct. at 2683–84.  The 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives voted to inter-
vene to defend the constitutionality of the statute.  Id. at 2684.  The majority of the Court 
held that the United States had standing to pursue the appeal, and did not directly ad-
dress whether BLAG had standing.  Id. at 2684–89.  The majority did not mention Raines, 
but it was discussed by two of the dissenting opinions.  Justice Scalia argued that the rea-
soning, if not the holding, of Raines suggests there was no standing over this dispute be-
 
136 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
As, if not more, interesting and important than these constitu-
tional questions are institutional ones.  Are the professed reasons for 
special constitutional courts—speed and resolving uncertain constitu-
tional questions—well-served by the provisions?  What about the ma-
jority of federal statutes that do not have such provisions?  Do the 
provisions, including the added symbolism of three judges sitting at 
the trial level, best serve the institutional responsibilities of Congress, 
and of federal courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particu-
lar, adjudicating the constitutionality of federal statutes?  These ques-
tions are explored in the balance of this Part.  I conclude that while 
these provisions do not deserve the sharp criticism of some commen-
tators, they are nonetheless on balance largely unnecessary, and in 
some ways can be counterproductive, and should not be enacted by 
Congress. 
A.  Institutional Responsibilities of Congress 
1.  Congressional Delegation to the Courts 
Recent scholarship has identified a principal defect of special con-
stitutional court provisions.  They are evidence, critics argue, that 
Congress in recent decades has not discharged its historic responsi-
bility of taking seriously its obligation to carefully consider the consti-
tutionality of statutes it passes. One prominent critic, Neal Devins, 
contends that recently, Congress is often “indifferent” to the constitu-
tionality of statutes it passes, or “treats the Constitution as the exclu-
sive province of the Supreme Court . . . .”87  Special review provisions, 
he continues, “delegate Congress’s power to interpret the Constitu-
tion to the Supreme Court,” and Congress thereby “signals the Court 
 
tween the legislative and executive branches on the constitutionality of DOMA.  Id. at 
2703 n.3, 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Alito, in contrast, allowed that whether 
BLAG had standing was a “difficult question,” id. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting), but that 
Raines did not prevent standing, for two reasons.  That case, he argued, dealt with indi-
vidual members of Congress, as opposed to one of the legislative branches acting collec-
tively, and they “were not the pivotal figures whose votes would have caused the Act [in 
question in Raines] to fail absent some challenged action.”  Id. at 2714.  It bears emphasis 
that DOMA had no special review provision, much less any language authorizing Con-
gress as a whole or any individual members to sue to challenge the constitutionality of the 
law.  For discussions of standing by Congress and its members in light of Windsor, see Tara 
Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1311 (2014). 
 87 Devins, supra note 12, at 442. 
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that it has little institutional stake in constitutional matters.”88  Other 
critics argue that some members of Congress may enthusiastically 
embrace the delegation evidenced by special review provisions, as it 
“enable[s] skeptical legislators to hold their noses and vote for popu-
lar bills that they opposed on constitutional or even partisan 
grounds.”89 
Devins does not rely merely on anecdotal evidence to support the-
se charges, but rather has extensively documented the seeming indif-
ference of Congress in recent decades to constitutional issues.  In a 
recent study of congressional hearings from 1970 to 2010, he demon-
strated that hearings on constitutional issues had fallen in both 
chambers of Congress (principally in the respective judiciary commit-
tees) since 1990.90  He attributed the decline largely to increased par-
ty polarization, the weakening of committee influence, and an in-
crease in posturing by members of Congress.91  More recently, Devins 
argued that Congress’ deliberation over the Affordable Care Act was 
a case study of this phenomenon, as “congressional committees paid 
virtually no attention to constitutional questions [about the Act] in 
hearings or committee reports.”92 
These criticisms of the special constitutional review provisions are 
not without relevance or force, but I think they belie a more compli-
cated story of their passage by Congress and effect on the courts.  
Consider the Affordable Care Act.  Despite apparent congressional 
indifference to constitutional issues before its passage, there was no 
special review provision in the law and, so far as I can tell, there was 
no serious discussion of adding such a provision.93  This suggests that 
 
 88 Id. at 442–43.  Devins gave the enactment of the Line Item Veto Act as an example, id. at 
443–44, and added that “[t]he Justices almost always invalidate congressional statutes that 
contain expedited review provisions.” Id. at 444. 
 89 Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution to the Courts:  Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, 
117 YALE L.J. 886, 897 (2008). The author gave congressional passage of the BCRA as an 
example.  Id.  See also Panas, supra note 12, at 170–72 (making arguments similar to 
Devins and Greene). 
 90 Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of Constitutional 
Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 741–53 (2011) (summarizing findings). 
 91 Id. at 782–83. 
 92 Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the Constitution When Enacting the Affordable 
Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 261, 270 (2012). 
 93 The issue goes unmentioned in Devins, id., and in other sources discussing the legislative 
history of, and constitutional doubts (mainly under the Commerce Clause) raised inside 
and outside of Congress during debate over, the ACA.  See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE 
TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE REFORM 72–90 (2013) 
(discussing “the constitutional limits that the ACA supposedly transgressed” and arguing 
that “scholars and judges worked hard to massage and improve them, but they never suc-
ceeded in answering obvious difficulties”).  On the other hand, to the extent that the 
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the creation story of the special review provisions is a more compli-
cated one and not entirely dependent on justifiable criticisms of the 
lack of congressional deliberations on the constitutionality of pro-
posed statutes.  A richer and more complicated narrative would not 
only include the presence or absence of such constitutional discourse 
in the legislature, but also such related factors as rational actions by 
Congress to advance policy goals, ordinary deal-making when statutes 
are passed, and interest group activity, among other things.94 
2.  Congressional Cooperation with the Courts 
It is one thing when Congress passes a statute with no, or virtually 
no, discussion of its constitutionality, much less of any special judicial 
review provision it may have (or no discussion of whether such a pro-
vision is appropriate, for the many statutes that do not have them).  
But there was some seemingly genuine discussion of constitutional 
issues in other statutes, if mainly on the floor of Congress before a fi-
nal vote, with the Line Item Veto Act being a good example.95  Con-
gress undeniably can send signals to the federal courts when it enacts 
statutes and in other ways.96  Rather than evidence of abdication of 
responsibilities, the presence of a special review provision can be 
conceptualized as a signal to the federal courts that the matter is a se-
rious one that ought to be undertaken with sufficient gravity by the 
third branch of government.  That is, it can be viewed as a height-
ened awareness by Congress that there are serious constitutional is-
 
supporters of the ACA took seriously the constitutional objections, perhaps they did not 
want any likely legal challenge to be facilitated or accelerated by a special review provi-
sion. 
 94 See BAUM, supra note 16, at 42–46 (discussing these and other reasons for creation of spe-
cialized courts in general); CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DESIGNING JUDICIAL REVIEW:  INTEREST 
GROUPS, CONGRESS, AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 15–33 (1997) (attributing design of 
judicial review provisions in part to interest groups affected by the statute in question); 
Alon Cohen, Independent Judicial Review:  A Blessing in Disguise, 37 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
209, 209–10 (2014) (arguing that providing for independent judicial review may be a de-
vice to enable politicians to destabilize a law they oppose). 
 95 See supra note 74. 
 96 See, e.g., Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 971 (2009) (examining how Court-curbing legislation proposed in 
Congress between 1877 and 2006 influenced the rate of the Supreme Court striking down 
federal statutes as unconstitutional); Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
914, 919 (2012) (discussing how Congress can exert influence over the judiciary); Eugen-
ia Froedge Toma, Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court:  The Budget as a Signaling 
Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (1991) (discussing how Congress uses budgets to signal 
intent). 
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sues at play, coupled with an arguably genuine concern that certain 
factors make a prompt resolution of the issue appropriate. 
The modern special review provisions can be usefully compared to 
the expansion of the jurisdiction of the three-judge district court in 
1937 to include constitutional challenges to federal statutes.97  It 
might seem odd that Congress at that time would put federal statutes 
on a speedier path toward review by a Supreme Court which had 
shown little hesitation to strike down New Deal legislation.  Several 
factors explain the incongruity.  The three-judge court provision was 
mainly intended to forestall the actions of district judges acting alone, 
some of whom (at least in the minds of Congress) had issued opin-
ions exhibiting overt hostility toward New Deal statutes.98  More 
broadly, the amount of sustained attention Congress gave to the con-
stitutional basis of early New Deal legislation seems limited.99  Rather 
than reflecting a clear congressional judgment on constitutional is-
sues, the 1937 expansion was primarily intended as a yoke on some 
federal judges in the lower courts perceived to be hostile to the New 
Deal.  Thus, the 1937 expansion was not predicated on constitutional 
doubts expressed in Congress, but rather on a general belief in the 
validity of that legislation and to avoid the binding (if temporary) ef-
fect of the decisions of single district judges.100  Contrary to Justice 
 
 97 See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text. 
 98 Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 30, at 617–18 (“[T]he inevitable irritation of Congress at 
the free-handed way in which single judges throughout the country enjoined the en-
forcement of some of the most vital measures ever enacted, made inevitable the require-
ment of Section 3 for a court of three judges to set aside the will of Congress.”). 
 99 See JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER:  FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 43 
(2010) (discussing the fact that legislation during this period was not given much atten-
tion). While the causes and consequences of the 1937 Court-packing plan remains the 
subject of scholarly debate, see, e.g., Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and 
the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052, 1052 (2005) (discussing cases from this era), there 
is common consensus that much early New Deal legislation was hurriedly drafted, with lit-
tle consideration to the constitutional basis for the laws. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The 
Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 79, 81 (1998) (discussing 
Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act of 1934 and noting that some believed it was rushed 
into legislation); Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
244, 251 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN:  
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995) and giving exam-
ples of legislation from this period that was quickly and poorly drafted).  By contrast, 
Congressional attention to that issue became greater once the Court began striking down 
legislation passed early in the New Deal.  See, e.g., DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND 
THE CONSTITUTION:  A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY 163–83 (1966) (discussing congressional 
consideration and discussion of constitutional basis for the Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act of 1935); Cushman, supra note 95, at 81–90 (discussing the drafting of various 
laws during the second New Deal). 
100 While congressional support for FDR’s court-packing plan eroded in the spring and 
summer of 1937, it does not follow that majorities in Congress were expressing doubts 
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Scalia and Professor Garner, then, enactment of a standing or partic-
ular special review provision is not inexorably evidence of constitu-
tional doubts in Congress. 
The seriousness of purpose can also be reflected by the other typi-
cal features of special review provisions.  Permitting members of 
Congress themselves to initiate or to intervene in the anticipated liti-
gation highlights the equal and complimentary footing one branch 
has with the other.  For the past several decades the appellate judges 
in the District of Columbia Circuit have often been regarded in many 
quarters as the second-most prestigious and important federal court.  
This is due to the perceived high quality of the federal judges serving 
in the District, the appeals of important agency and other administra-
tive actions exclusively vested in the District, and the fact that many 
Supreme Court Justices have previously served on the D.C. Circuit.101  
Placing exclusive venue of special constitutional litigation in the Cir-
cuit (recall that three-judge district courts have at least one circuit 
judge) might be said to underline the importance Congress wishes to 
give these proceedings.  All these factors can be said to resemble a di-
alogue between Congress and the Court, which scholars have ad-
vanced as descriptive of and normatively preferable to the relation-
ship between Congress and the Supreme Court.102 
 
about the constitutionality of New Deal legislation.  Also, passage of the 1937 expansion 
took place on August 24 of that year, after the plan had been abandoned and the contro-
versy subsided.  Indeed, by that point the Court had begun upholding New Deal legisla-
tion, and the expansion makes even more sense as an effort to rein in possibly hostile dis-
trict judges sitting alone and to expedite appeals to a now more friendly Supreme Court.  
See SHESOL, supra note 99, at 516; Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 30, at 610 (observing 
the fear “[t]hat the fate of acts of Congress should depend, even temporarily, upon the 
view of a single judge”). Cf. Michael P. Foradas, Comment, Section 1252:  A Jurisdictional 
Dinosaur, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 175, 177–78 (1980) (discussing relationship or lack thereof 
between the Court-packing plan and the expansion of the three-judge district court). 
101 See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT 7–19 (1999) 
(discussing the rise of the DC Circuit); LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES:  A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE 351 (2013) (pointing out that DC Circuit judges are disproportionately 
considered for the Supreme Court); Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 
23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 131 (2013) (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s unique repu-
tation); John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. 
L. REV. 375, 375 (2006) (discussing the differences between the D.C. Circuit and other 
circuit courts); Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (2005) (exploring the reputations 
of some courts of appeals, including the D.C. Circuit). 
102 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue:  The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Juris-
diction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1990) (offering “a view of federal jurisdiction in which 
the boundaries of authority are far less clear than commentary suggests, and in which the 
contours of federal jurisdiction are resolved as the result of an interactive process be 
ween Congress and the Court on the appropriate uses and bounds of the federal judicial 
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At least some of the special review provisions might be viewed, 
again, not as abdication of congressional responsibilities, but rather 
as the product of the rather ordinary process of the passage of most 
statutes and the compromise and deal-making process that often at-
tends that passage.  The provisions in recent election law statutes 
provide a good example.  There is some evidence that the special ju-
dicial review provisions of the 1974 amendments to FECA were due to 
an explicit or implicit compromise between the proponents and op-
ponents of the law.  Constitutional questions had been discussed in 
the legislative debates, and there is some suggestion that both sup-
porters and opponents anticipated a constitutional challenge, and 
each side was betting that courts would uphold their views.103  The 
regular cycle of elections and the planning for campaigns elevates the 
need for rapidity and resolution of constitutional challenges.104  Per-
haps they also thought that the federal judges in the District, not be-
holden to the political and legal culture of particular states, might be 
more sophisticated about politics and more likely to uphold the 
law.105  On the other hand, the language permitting members of Con-
gress to sue arguably removed doubts about the standing of legisla-
tors, and seemingly made a constitutional attack easier.  Similar rea-
sons might account for the special review provisions of the BCRA.106  
 
power”); Devins & Fitts, supra note 12, at 359 (“Just as the Court informs Congress about 
the meaning of the Constitution, Congress too should educate the Court.”).  Since the 
1990s, increasing polarization between the parties in Congress, and apparent conflict at 
times between Congress as a whole and the Court, has led some observers to conclude 
that the dialogue is moribund.  See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Po-
larization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013) (“Although 
political polarization has benefitted the Supreme Court's power relative to Congress in 
the short term, the longer-term power relations are more uncertain.”).  But see Matthew 
R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1318–25 (2014) (arguing that 
overrides of statutory overrides are more prevalent than sometimes recognized and may 
be so in the future). 
103 See Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 774–75 (“Yet, the very existence of the provi-
sion suggests that (some of) the drafters and their supporters wished to facilitate a court 
challenge.”); Rebecca Curry, Making Law with Lawsuits:  Understanding Judicial Review in 
Campaign Finance Policy, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 389, 419–27 (2013) (“Among a certain fac-
tion of FECA's authors, there is ample evidence of an attempt to kill the law with constitu-
tionalism.”). 
104 See Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (discussing this 
need in light of the repetition of elections). 
105 See Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 773 (“Perhaps the supporters thought a feder-
al district court in the District of Columbia would, all things being equal, possess more le-
gal acumen and political sophistication than federal judges elsewhere . . . .”). 
106 See Douglas, supra note 70, at 468–69; Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 773–75 
(noting the “various reasons” that “special review provisions may have been an implicit 
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Some of the other special review provisions discussed earlier might 
also be characterized as the product of legislative compromise. 
I am not suggesting that these alternative rationales are preferable 
to the more cynical ones advanced by Justice Scalia and other critics 
of special review provisions.  Rather, my point is that a fuller appreci-
ation of the reasons driving congressional behavior suggests that the 
special review provisions are not devoid of some arguably sound ra-
tionales.  Nonetheless, I believe these provisions do not reflect sound 
policy.  The principal reasons I reach this conclusion are found in the 
next Subsection of this Part. 
B.  Institutional Effects on the Courts 
As noted above,107 the demise of the standing three-judge court 
district to adjudicate constitutional challenges to federal statutes was 
largely due to opposition from the Supreme Court and its allies.  The 
opposition was based on the asserted deleterious effects on the oper-
ation of the federal courts.  Critics argued that it was administratively 
burdensome to assemble such courts, that direct appeals to the Su-
preme Court burdened the usual discretionary docket control, and 
that ultimately the special process was unnecessary. 108  To be sure, the 
special review provisions addressed in this Article do not duplicate 
the standing court repealed in 1976.  The newer provisions are at-
tached to a relatively few specific statutes.  Nonetheless, they share 
some of the same characteristics as the three-judge district court as it 
existed before the 1976 repeal, and often have some aspects (e.g., ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the District Court for the District of Columbia) 
not found in the prior court. 109  The demise of the older court, and 
the purported benefits of the usual way of litigating challenges to 
most federal statutes, provide useful markers to examine the effects 
of the new constitutional review provisions. 
1.  Specialization and Percolation 
Recall that the repealed three-judge district court for challenging 
federal statutes was an amendment to the then-existing court used to 
adjudicate challenges to state statutes.  Many of the criticisms ulti-
mately launched against the latter applied with equal force to the 
 
part of the legislative deal that culminated in passage of the BCRA”); Panas, supra note 
12, at 164 (referencing FECA). 
107 See supra Part II. 
108 Solimine, supra note 272727, at 134–44. 
109 Solimine, supra note 272727, at 148–49. 
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former.  Consider vesting a constitutional challenge to a federal stat-
ute in a specialized court, as opposed to other issues, such as cases 
raising interpretation, application or enforcement of the statute.  
Specialized courts for what are regarded as particularly unique or 
complicated areas of law (e.g., patent or taxes) may be beneficial.110  
But constitutional issues, as such, do not seem to fall into that catego-
ry.  While the statutes themselves may sometimes be complicated, the 
constitutional provisions at issue are not.  Indeed, the problem is of-
ten that the constitutional language is open-ended and raises issues 
and requires decision-making that resembles the overtly political and 
policy judgments of the non-judicial branches of government.111  This 
is of course not to say that constitutional litigation is not complex and 
complicated compared to other cases typically litigated in federal 
courts.  Nonetheless, whatever else might be said about the resolution 
of constitutional cases, not the least of which is the debate over inter-
pretative methodologies to cabin judicial (and particularly Supreme 
Court) discretion, there seems no strong reason to assemble a special 
group of judges to make such decisions at the trial level. 
All of the new provisions have a direct appeal of the trial court de-
cision to the Supreme Court, different from the ordinary discretion-
ary certiorari jurisdiction.112  A direct appeal, which ostensibly must be 
 
110 Specialized courts in the federal system have not been without controversy, as not having 
served their intended goals.  For example, the jury is still out on the establishment of the 
Federal Circuit in 1982 as the one appellate court for (among other things) patent litiga-
tion.  Some scholars argue that the Federal Circuit has not delivered on its promise to 
provide uniformity and stability in patent law.  Circuit splits on patent issues have disap-
peared, but the Supreme Court has increasingly taken an active role in reviewing, and 
sometimes reversing, the patent decisions of the Federal Circuit.  For overviews of the de-
bate, see BAUM, supra note 16, at 181–86; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and 
Coherent Adjudication:  The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505 (2013); John M. 
Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit:  Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized 
Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553 (2010); Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal 
Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1802–03 (2013).  Some have argued that returning 
patent issues to circuit percolation, or even to state courts, might be advisable.  See, e.g., 
Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 16 (challenging “the as-
sumptions that legal uniformity and patent-specific expertise justify excluding state courts 
from hearing patent cases”); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s 
Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2007) (finding fault in “the Federal 
Circuit's exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over patent cases”). 
111 See Richard A. Posner, A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 39–40 (2005) (exploring 
whether courts should be considered political bodies when deciding constitutional ques-
tions). 
112 Congress acted twice to repeal the former direct appeal:  in 1976 to eliminate the three-
judge district court to hear constitutional challenges to federal statutes, which also elimi-
nated the direct appeal associated with those courts, and in 1988 to eliminate a direct ap-
peal from any district court decision holding a federal statute unconstitutional.  See supra 
Part II. 
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decided by the Court, deprives the Court of the benefit of a decision 
by a court of appeals, but also of the views of other federal courts 
across the country which may have ruled on the issue.  In a direct ap-
peal, only three judges (and sometimes only one, depending on the 
statute) will have considered the matter, while in ordinary litigation 
and appeals potentially a score or more of federal judges may have 
done so before it reaches the Court.  The phenomenon of the perco-
lation of issues in the lower courts, before Supreme Court review, has 
generated a large commentary.  Proponents of percolation, on113 and 
off114 the Court, argue that the Court (and the federal court system as 
a whole) benefits from the potential diversity of views generated by 
different jurists in different courts rulings on an issue.  Such percola-
tion may aid the Court in deciding whether to review an issue at all, 
in reaching a more informed final decision once it decides to resolve 
a split in authority, and by encouraging lower court judges to take 
their jobs more seriously, knowing that their work may aid in develop-
ing the law.  Proponents argue that the benefits of percolation are 
particularly important in constitutional cases, since there Congress 
has fewer options to respond, as opposed to cases involving what 
Congress sees as an errant decision of statutory interpretation.115  
Proponents are thus particularly skeptical of most specialized 
courts,116 and presumably would be skeptical of the new specialized 
review provisions. 
Critics of percolation are found on117 and off118 the Court as well.  
They contend that the putative benefits are overstated.  Some point 
 
113 E.g., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (“In my [Justice Stevens] judgment it 
is a sound exercise of discretion for the Court to allow the various States to serve as labor-
atories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court”).  
114 E.g., POSNER, supra note 17, at 263–64; Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1567, 1573 (2008) (questioning whether judicial uniformity is a valuable goal); Doni 
Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism:  Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive Sys-
tem, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 481–94 (2012) (suggesting “the need for a new approach to 
lower court constitutionalism, one that recognizes the full set of normative values ad-
vanced by an interpretive system that empowers lower courts to make choices about con-
stitutional meaning”). 
115 E.g., Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture:  Modifying the Regional Design of the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 633–34 (1989) (arguing that percolation 
“has its greatest force in relation to constitutional questions”). 
116 E.g., Revesz, supra note 13, at 1155–59 (analyzing “a set of arguments that generally coun-
sel against the creation of specialized courts that are not subject to review in the general-
ist courts of appeals”). 
117 E.g., Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (1986) (“And to go further and suggest that it is actually desirable to allow im-
portant questions of federal law to ‘percolate’ in the lower courts for a few years before 
the Supreme Court takes them on seems to me a very strange suggestion; at best it is mak-
ing a virtue of necessity.”). 
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out that delaying a definitive resolution while an issue plays out in the 
lower courts is unfair to the litigant who happened to be before the 
court that ruled the incorrect way.119  Others argue that percolation 
perpetuates uncertainty and non-uniformity in the law, especially 
problematic when it comes to the interpretation of constitutional 
rights which ostensibly apply equally across the nation.120  Still others 
contend that the Supreme Court rarely internalizes the benefits of 
percolation.  While the Court may refer to a circuit split in an opin-
ion mentioning why it granted certiorari, it appears, critics argue, 
that the Court rarely relies on the analysis developed by lower courts 
when fashioning its final decision.121  The critics would presumably be 
less skeptical of a special review provision which bypasses any percola-
tion in the lower courts. 
How do these critiques apply to the special review statutes?  Does 
the Court resolve appeals from cases not involving such provisions in 
a better or more informed way than cases on direct appeal?  It is diffi-
cult to say, since the quality of a Supreme Court decision is much in 
the eye of a beholder; objective indicia of opinion quality are notori-
ously difficult to apply.  Doctrinal reliance by the Court on lower 
court opinions grappling with the merits is one way to measure the 
 
118 E.g., Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 690 
(1990) (arguing that “[w]hether or not percolation works—and how well it works—are 
matters of accident”); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony:  Federal Circuit Splits and 
the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1160–85 (2012) (examining “the difficulties 
presented by” circuit splits, particularly in the Fourth Circuit). 
119 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 118, at 689 (“[W]e must always remember that perpetuating 
uncertainty and instability during a process of percolation exacts important and painful 
costs.  Of course, law professors and appellate judges do not pay these costs.  It is the citi-
zens and firms whose affairs are confounded and prejudiced by uncertainty and instability 
in the law who pay the price.”); Rehnquist, supra note 117, at 11 (“It is of little solace to 
the litigant who lost years ago in a court of appeals decision to learn that his case was part 
of the ‘percolation’ process which ultimately allowed the Supreme Court to vindicate his 
position.”). 
120 See, e.g., Logan, supra note 118, at 1171–74 (arguing that “[a]llowing such variation is a 
recipe for public disillusionment over the authoritativeness of national institutions”). 
121 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 118, at 690 (questioning whether “the Supreme Court Justices 
and law clerks read” lower court opinions); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: 
The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1994) 
(“I question whether inferior court judgments significantly influence ultimate Supreme 
Court rulings very often.”); Henry J. Friendly, The “Law of the Circuit” and All That:  Fore-
word to  the Second Circuit 1970 Term, 46 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 406, 407 (1972) (“If a case in-
volves questions of federal law of such importance as to be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, the views of the court of appeals count, and should count, for little.”). The Court 
has also been unclear and inconsistent about what deferential weight, if any, it gives to 
the numbers of circuits on each side of a circuit split.  For a discussion of this, see Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 853-856 (2014) 
(questioning the weight that should be given to unbalanced circuit decisions). 
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efficacy of percolation or its absence.  Some empirical studies suggest 
that this rarely occurs in the Supreme Court.122  For a very small re-
cent sample, contrast NFIB v. Sebelius and Citizens United.  Recall that 
there was a circuit split in the former case.  There was some modest 
reference in the majority opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts,123 
and in the concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Ruth Gins-
burg, to the lower court opinions to support their analyses.124  By con-
trast, none of the opinions in Citizens United relied in any substantive 
way on the analysis of the lower court opinion, save for a few fleeting 
references to the facts of or the record in the case.125 
Definitively drawing the conclusion that the Court rarely relies on 
lower court opinions in its analysis when there are circuit splits, and 
rarer still when it decides cases on direct appeal, awaits further empir-
ical study.  What can be said at this point is that there seem very few 
occasions in direct appeals, as compared to circuit splits, for the 
Court to gain the advantage of discerning how more than one lower 
court considered and resolved an issue.  While it is true that the 
Court rarely expressly acknowledges that advantage, even in cases 
with circuit splits, some empirical research indicates that the Court 
takes into account the presence or absence of a circuit split when de-
 
122 E.g., Logan, supra note 118, at 1167–68 (publishing study of 138 Fourth Amendment de-
cisions in the Supreme Court from 1981 to 2010 Terms, which demonstrates the Court 
rarely mentioned the existence of a circuit split and rarely utilized circuit court opinions 
to develop the doctrine resolving the case). 
123 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012) (citing and abrogating 
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, , 551 (6th Cir. 2011)); id. at 2588 (citing Seven-Sky v. 
Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 14–15 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
124 Id. at 2620–22 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Thomas 
More, 651 F.3d at 561, 565 (Sutton, J., concurring in part) and Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 16). 
The joint opinion of four Justices dissenting did not cite a lower court opinion. 
125 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 322–23 (2010) (citations to lower court opinion 
for procedural history purposes).  Perhaps a better comparison would be to the precursor 
to Citizens United, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  The former case was mainly con-
sidering whether to reverse the latter, and the lower court understandably did not con-
sider that issue.  In contrast, in the latter case the BCRA had just been passed, and a host 
of new factual and legal issues was confronting both the three-judge panel and the Su-
preme Court.  The Court in McConnell made frequent reference to the lower court deci-
sion regarding the record in the case and the factual findings made below. E.g., id. at 
124–29, 146–51, 175–76; id. at 301–04 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  At several points the 
Court also arguably adopted or relied in part on the legal analysis of the district court, as 
evidenced by citations to the lower court opinions.  E.g., id. at 167–68, 193, 197 (discuss-
ing issues that were undisputed or agreed upon by all the lower court judges, or quoting 
the lower court extensively).  In its most recent BCRA decision, the Court made only brief 
reference to the analysis of the court below.  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1455 
(2014) (describing this analysis in only a few sentences). Cf. id. at 1481–84 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (providing extensive quotations from district court opinion in McConnell in Ap-
pendix A to the opinion). 
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ciding whether to review a case, and if so, resolving it on the merits.  
In the latter circumstance, the Court will often (whether it acknowl-
edges it or not) take the side of the majority of the circuits in a split.126  
The existence of a circuit split may also inform the selection of cases 
for review,127 and perhaps even the drafting of an opinion,128 even 
when not expressly mentioned in the opinion.  These benefits, mod-
est though they may be when there are circuit splits, seem practically 
nonexistent when there are direct appeals.129 
A related (if imperfect) way to measure the quality of lower court 
opinions is the rate of reversal on appeal.130  On that score, the feder-
 
126 See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on 
Supreme Court Decisionmaking:  A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 135, 135 
(2006) (studying 338 Supreme Court decisions from the 1985–1995 Terms, where certio-
rari was granted to resolve a circuit split, and showing that the Court was more likely to 
adopt the position of a majority of the circuits); see also Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kas-
tellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the Lower Courts:  An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 J. 
POL. 150, 150 (2013) (arguing the Court faces a strategic tradeoff between allowing a 
conflict to continue to gain information, and ending the conflict by grating review, and in 
study using data from Lindquist & Klein article found that review is typically granted only 
after a conflict persists). 
127 Gewirtzman, supra note 114, at 493–94. 
128 Cf. Pamela C. Corley, Paul M. Collins Jr. & Bryan Calvin, Lower Court Influence on U.S. Su-
preme Court Opinion Content, 73 J. POL. 31, 31 (2011) (publishing study of Supreme Court 
majority opinions in 2002–2004 Terms, using plagiarism software, that showed the Court 
systematically incorporated language from lower court opinions). 
129 Depending on the length and number of opinions in the lower court, and particularly if 
it is a three-judge district court, there might be some similarities to full percolation.  For 
example, in McConnell all three judges on the lower court issued their own lengthy opin-
ions, in addition to the per curiam opinion of that court, and the three separate opinions 
take up over 800 pages in the official reports.  See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176–
919 (D.D.C. 2003); see also Solimine, supra note 47, at 776–77 (discussing these opinions).  
But this is an exception to the ordinary opinion generation that has occurred in cases 
with special review provisions.  Cf. Ryan Stephenson, Note, Federal Circuit Case Selection at 
the Supreme Court:  An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 286–87 (2013) (suggesting that 
for case selection by the Supreme Court, dissents in the Federal Circuit are substitutes for 
circuit splits that ordinarily occur in non-patent cases). 
   On the other hand, a procedural quirk of three-judge district court litigation, with 
direct review, can deprive that litigation of even modest information to the Court about 
circuit court opinion on issues.  There is not a circuit split as such, but rather a split of au-
thority among three-judge district courts about how much precedential weight, if any, 
such courts should give to the opinions of the circuits in which they sit.  Since three-judge 
district court opinions are not reviewed by the court of appeals, some argue that it is in-
appropriate for the former court to be bound by the decisions of the latter.  The con-
trasting, and apparently majority view seems to be that such courts should give such 
weight to circuit authority, although most courts seem to do it without extensive discus-
sion of the issue.  For discussion, compare Parker v. Ohio, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1105 
(S.D. Ohio 2003) (three-judge court) (stating that it is bound by circuit decisions) with id. 
at 1112 n.3 (Gwin, J., concurring) (questioning this assumption). 
130 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publica-
tions, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 518, 519 (2011) (making arguments 
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al district court decisions rendered under the special review provi-
sions addressed in this Article do comparatively well.  Of the twenty-
two lower court decisions appealed to the Supreme Court, fourteen, 
or 64%, were affirmed by only an opinion or in a summary fashion.131  
Given that the historic reversal rate of the Supreme Court in all cases 
is about 50%, this suggests that the specialized trial courts are getting 
it right more often than not.132  On the other hand, the direct appeals 
mandated by the special review provisions present a skewed sample of 
cases, unlike the other cases on the Court’s docket, which it assem-
bles by way of the discretionary writ of certiorari. 
2.  Exclusive Jurisdiction in the District of Columbia Circuit 
Many of the special review provisions vest exclusive jurisdiction of 
constitutional challenges in a three-judge district court in the District 
of Columbia, followed by a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.  As 
previously observed,133 the federal courts in the District possess juris-
diction beyond the civil and criminal matters that arise from people 
living and working there.  In addition, Congress has vested exclusive 
or permissible jurisdiction in those district courts and the appellate 
court over a wide range of challenges to the administrative decisions 
of the federal government, and of appeals from federal agency deci-
sions.134  This is true no matter in what other state or states the under-
lying controversy arises.  The expertise and sophistication of the fed-
 
about reversal rates based on the types of circuits in which judges sit); Jonathan Remy 
Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived 
Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745 (2008) (publishing data on “affirmance 
rates in and citation rates to appellate bankruptcy opinions” and making arguments 
about the quality of those decisions). 
131 The number and percentage of affirmances rises to 15% and 65%, respectively, if we in-
clude one decision that was affirmed in part and reversed in part.  If we further exclude 
one appeal that was dismissed, there are nineteen lower court decisions with an affir-
mance rate of 79%.  Four lower court decisions were reversed or vacated.  In these calcu-
lations, I exclude one case where certiorari was denied.  For the lower court decisions and 
the disposition (if any) by the Supreme Court that are the bases for these calculations, see 
supra notes 46–66 & accompanying text. 
132 On the historic reversal in the Supreme Court for all cases, see EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 
729–35 (setting out affirmance and reversal rates of decisions from the U.S. courts of ap-
peals and the U.S. district courts from 1946 to 2009 Terms). 
133 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
134 Many statutes place exclusive review of agency decisions or other matters in the district 
court or in the D.C. Circuit.  Other provisions, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), are not exclusive 
but permit a litigant to sue in, among other places, the place of work of a high agency of-
ficial, which is typically the District.  See Solimine, supra note 101, at 127; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976, 982–85 (1982) (discuss-
ing “[v]enue in [a]dministrative [r]eview”). 
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eral judges serving on these courts in dealing with complex and im-
portant legal and policy questions has led the D.C. Circuit to be tout-
ed as the second-most important court in the United States.135 
The District of Columbia Circuit is rightly regarded as being 
staffed with highly qualified judges who perform good work on diffi-
cult and important cases, often in the area of administrative and reg-
ulatory law.  This specialization does not spill over, however, into con-
stitutional law as such, much less questions regarding the 
constitutionality of federal statutes.  There is no reason federal judges 
in the District carry more knowledge or insight about such questions 
as compared to federal judges sitting elsewhere in the United States.  
The vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the District over many admin-
istrative or regulatory matters may well be efficient and justified, but 
it is an exception to the general, long-standing notion that the re-
gional dispersion of the federal courts is the better practice.136  Plac-
ing exclusive jurisdiction in the District carries with it the potential 
detriments of any specialized court, such as the politicization of the 
judicial selection process for the court, or the undue influence of a 
specialized bar or other interest groups.137  In recent years, there has 
been political controversy over the nominations of judges on the D.C. 
Circuit by both Democratic and Republican presidents, when the 
Senate was controlled by the other party.  Until filibuster rules were 
controversially changed for such nominations late in 2013, vacancies 
on the D.C. Circuit had gone unfilled for years.138  There has also 
 
135 The D.C. Circuit has replaced the Second Circuit as enjoying this label.  For discussion of 
the switch, see Solimine, supra note 101, at 1332 n.5, 1353–61. 
136 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS:  AS APPROVED BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 43 (1995) (“History suggests the val-
ue of maintaining regional connections between appellate judges and the trial judges 
whose decisions they review, and between appellate judges and the litigants who appear 
in their courts.”); POSNER, supra note 17, at 258–59 (supporting regional dispersion of 
federal appellate courts). 
137 See BAUM, supra note 16, at 34–41 (discussing “the effects of specialization on the sub-
stance of judicial policy”). 
138 For overviews of the recent controversy over nominations to the D.C. Circuit, see Carl 
Hulse, G.O.P. Stirring Feud in Senate On U.S. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, at A1; Doug 
Kendall & Simon Lazarus, Broken Circuit, 30 ENVTL. F. 36 (2013); Jeremy W. Peters, Senate 
Vote Curbs Filibuster Power to Stall Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013, at A1.  Earlier, several 
Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced a bill that would re-
duce the number of full-time judges on the D.C. Circuit from eleven to eight.  Court Effi-
ciency Act of 2013, S. 699, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(1)(2013).  Supporters of the bill argued 
that the reduction was justified by that circuit’s comparatively small caseload.  Critics ar-
gued that it was an effort to prevent President Obama from filling vacancies on that 
court.  Michael D. Shear & Jeremy Peters, Judicial Picks Set the Stage for a Battle In the Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A12.  That all said, there appears to be less controversy over 
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been long-standing, if more muted, controversy over the vesting of 
jurisdiction in the District over disputes mainly concerning other 
parts of the United States.139 
The federal courts in the D.C. Circuit loomed large in the litiga-
tion culminating in Shelby County v. Holder,140 in which the Supreme 
Court held the current version of the preclearance provision of the 
Voting Rights Act (VRA) unconstitutional.141  That provision required 
certain jurisdictions to pre-clear election law changes by seeking the 
approval of either the Department of Justice or of a three-judge dis-
trict court in the District of Columbia.  The legislative history of the 
latter provision indicates that exclusive venue was placed in the Dis-
trict, due to the fear (at least in 1965, the year of initial passage) that 
federal judges in the South would not be sympathetic to enforcement 
of the VRA, and that judges in Washington might eventually build up 
expertise in and generate uniform law on these matters.142  The pro-
cedural posture of Shelby County was such that the constitutional at-
tack on the preclearance provision was brought before a single dis-
trict judge in the District of Columbia, with the usual appellate 
 
the appointment of district judges for the District, who (unlike in other circuits) are rare-
ly elevated to the court of appeals. 
139 For discussion, see Thomas O. McGarity, Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of 
Administrative Action, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 302, 308 (1980) (discussing a dispute over the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit’s jurisdiction); Edward M. Mullins & Rima Y. Mullins, You Better 
Shop Around: Appellate Forum Shopping, 25 LITIGATION 32, 35 (1999); Sunstein, supra note 
134, at 979 (discussing “venue reform proposals” that would “bar institution of suit in the 
District of Columbia unless the agency decision under review had a substantial local im-
pact”).  
140 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
141 Specifically, the majority of the Court held unconstitutional the coverage formula, section 
4 of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b, thus negating use of the preclearance requirements of 
section 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.  Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court stops any application of § 5 [of the VRA] by holding that § 4(b)’s coverage 
formula is unconstitutional.”). 
142 For discussion of the motivations of the drafters of the preclearance provision in 1965 
regarding venue, see ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 16–21 (1987); Chandler Davidson & Bernard 
Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE 
SOUTH:  THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 378, 379 (Chadler Da-
vidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); Gyung-Ho Jeong, Gary J. Miller & Itai Sened, Clos-
ing the Deal:  Negotiating Civil Rights Legislation, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 588, 599–601 (2009).  
Attempts to broaden venue for preclearance actions, beyond just the federal court in the 
District of Columbia, were rejected in the in the 1970 and 1975 reauthorizations.  DAVID 
J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA:  MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
OF 1965, at 194–96 (1978) (discussing these attempts); GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD 
JUSTICE:  THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
204–10 (2013) (discussing the Voting Rights Act). See generally Solimine, Institutional, su-
pra note 47, at 784 n.76. 
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process thereafter.143  Neither the majority nor the dissent in Shelby 
County made any specific qualitative or evaluative reference to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction for preclearance litigation.144  If Congress revisits 
the preclearance process, it might find it difficult to again vest exclu-
sive jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit, as it would show a lack of confi-
dence, however justified it might have been in 1965, in other federal 
judges throughout the country.145 
 
143 Given the controversy over the constitutionality of the reauthorization of the preclear-
ance provision in 2006, see, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Pre-
clearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 
(2005); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 
174, 186–92 (2007), it is perhaps surprising that Congress did not include a special review 
provision to govern an expected constitutional challenge.  Perhaps the assumption was 
that the three-judge district court convened to hear preclearance actions would naturally 
entertain such a challenge, as indeed it did in Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009) (noting how the court below addressed the constitu-
tional question), aff’g on other grounds, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge 
court).  In contrast, the plaintiff in Shelby County did not request preclearance (or a 
bailout from preclearance requirements), but rather sought a declaratory judgment.  811 
F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 113 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013).  The same district judge held in related litigation that a three-judge district 
court under Section 5 need not be convened to hear a constitutional challenge when that 
remedy was sought.  See Laroque v. Holder, 755 F. Supp. 2d 156, 165–66 (D.D.C. 2010), 
rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  For further discussion, see Solimine, 
Reapportionment, supra note 42, at 1138–39 & n.151. 
144 Nor did Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Shelby County, 113 S. Ct. at 2631–32 
(Thomas, J., concurring), or his dissenting opinion in NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. at 212–29 
(Thomas, J., dissenting), both of which concluded that Congress lacked constitutional 
power in 2006 to renew § 5 of the VRA. 
145 The decision in Shelby County to strike down the current version of section 4 of the VRA 
has made moribund the preclearance provisions of Section 5.  This in turn has reinvigor-
ated interest in the heretofore relatively little used “bail-in” provisions of section 3 of the 
VRA.  Adam Liptak & Charlie Savage, U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A1 (discussing how the Obama Administration after Shelby County 
is attempting to use Section 3 regarding election law changes in Texas, previously gov-
erned by Section 5 preclearance).  The bail-in provision, unlike the preclearance provi-
sion, first requires that a district court make findings that a state voting practice is uncon-
stitutional, and then retaining jurisdiction to in effect preclear changes to such practices.  
42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).  Also unlike Section 5, the bail-in provision does not place venue in 
the DOJ or the federal courts in D.C., but rather before a three-judge district court in 
that state.  The reason for the latter difference is not clear.  Presumably it was based on 
the notion that local federal courts will be more familiar with the facts upon which a find-
ing of unconstitutionality will be based.  See Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Se-
cret Weapon:  Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2008–09 
(2010) (“In pocket trigger litigation, however, the local district court regains jurisdiction 
and can receive preclearance requests.”).  Should Congress revisit Sections 4 and 5 in the 
wake of Shelby County, the Section 3 model of vesting enforcement in local three-judge dis-
trict courts, rather than in the District of Columbia, could provide a model.  See Michael 
E. Solimine, Rethinking District of Columbia Venue in Voting Rights Preclearance Actions, 102 
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 29, 40 (2014) (making this argument). 
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In contrast to the VRA, the legislative history of the specialized re-
view provisions, such as it is, says virtually nothing about why the Dis-
trict of Columbia is chosen.  Perhaps it is due in part to strategic ma-
neuvering by members of Congress, thinking that federal judges in 
the District simply know more about the legislative process and would 
be more (or depending on your point of view, less) likely to uphold 
the statute.  Or, perhaps it is simply more convenient for Congress 
(and perhaps the lawyers expected to litigate such matters) to place 
jurisdiction in the District, especially given the provisions allowing for 
members of Congress to bring suit challenging the statutes.146  How-
ever, these are not especially sound reasons to require that such chal-
lenges, by members of Congress or anyone else, be brought in the 
District.  The first contributes to the politicization of the federal 
judges in the District.  The second elevates convenience to an unrea-
sonably high virtue.  The better course, if there has to be special re-
view provisions at all, is to allow venue anywhere in the United States, 
just as it is with any other suit.147 
3.  Trials by Three Judges, Expediting Decisions, and Supreme Court 
Docket Control 
In the abstract there is nothing wrong with setting up judicial pro-
cedures to require or encourage federal courts to expeditiously de-
cide the constitutionality of federal statutes.  Even when promptness 
is not directly necessary to the efficient operation of the law (consid-
er, say, the Flag Protection Act), there is something to be said for 
questions over a statute that applies to the whole nation and which 
must be resolved as quickly as possible.  That said, there can be too 
much of a good thing.  There is considerable evidence that the expe-
diting procedures for the litigation involving the 1974 Amendments 
to FECA, and at least in some instances for litigation under the 
BCRA, led to hurried proceedings at the lower court levels and an in-
adequate compilation of a record.148 
 
146 For speculations along these lines, see Fraser et al., supra note 101, at 145–48; Solimine, 
Institutional, supra note 47, at 773. 
147 Divesting the District of Columbia of exclusive jurisdiction over such cases might admit-
tedly lead to an unseemly race to the courthouse by plaintiffs seeking a favorable forum.   
But that is true of other cases and is a necessary consequence and cost of geographically 
dispersed lower courts.  The other putative benefits of the special review provisions would 
still accrue. 
148 See, for example, on the Buckley v. Valeo litigation, Solimine, supra note 47, at 775–76 
(“The Justices self-consciously took seriously the mandate to expedite their resolution of 
the case, and while it would be unfair to characterize Buckley as a rushed job (and Hasen 
does not), certain aspects of the opinion were not well thought out, and some of that 
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A related problem is the convening of a three-judge district court 
to hold a hearing or trial, in which (among other things) evidence is 
taken, a record is assembled, and findings of fact and conclusions of 
law are entered, all normally the job of a single district judge.  These 
are awkward tasks for most federal judges to undertake collectively.  
The awkwardness is compounded by the composition of the panel.  
At least one judge must be from the appellate court, so the panel 
consists of at least one judge who normally does not hold trials, and 
one or two trial judges whose work in other cases is reviewed by the 
same appellate judge.149  These administrative difficulties, among oth-
er things, contributed to the criticisms of the standing three-judge 
district court before its curtailment in 1976.150 
These same critics argued that expediting mandates were unnec-
essary, since judges in the normal three-tier litigation process could, 
when necessary and upon request of the parties, expedite the process 
at the trial and appellate levels.151  It is true that modern (i.e., post-
1976) three-judge district litigation has a generally admirable record 
in rapidly litigating cases to final disposition (when there is an ap-
 
might be attributable to the unusual procedural posture of the case.”); Panas, supra note 
12, at 167–68 (“The Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo is probably the most notorious ex-
ample of expedited review occurring in an abstract factual context.”).  On McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), see Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 776–79 (discussing 
“the effect of the special review provisions in McConnell).  On the other hand, many of the 
special review statutes seem to in effect authorize, and commonly lead to, facial constitu-
tional attacks on statutes, as opposed to as-applied attacks.  In theory, it would seem that 
this would mean less of a need to develop an extensive record at the trial level.  No doubt, 
there are many exceptions to the generalization just made, with McConnell being a nota-
ble example.  In any event, Professor Fallon’s recent empirical study has considerably un-
dermined the conventional wisdom that facial attacks on statutes are generally rare and 
unsuccessful in the Supreme Court.  See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction 
About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915 (2011). 
149 For discussion of these problems affecting three-judge district courts in general, see Soli-
mine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 42, at 116–18.  For discussion on how these fac-
tors were arguably demonstrated at the trial level in McConnell, see Solimine, Institutional, 
supra note 47, at 777–78.  For acknowledgment of the difficulties by judges sitting on 
three-judge district courts, see Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 501–02 (D.D.C. 
1980) (three-judge court), aff’d by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).  A counter-
vailing consideration could be the possibility of a dissenting opinion on the three-judge 
court serving as a signal to the Supreme Court that the issues are contested and thus ar-
guably more worthy of review.  For discussion of that factor, drawing on studies of three-
judge panels on the courts of appeals, see Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial 
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:  Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156 (1998); Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Left, Right, and Center:  
Strategic Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels, 29 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 638 
(2011). 
150 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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peal) to the Supreme Court.  One recent study showed that “the Su-
preme Court disposes of most cases within about a year or less of the 
district court’s final decision.”152  But federal judges are capable of 
similarly swift decision-making under the three-tier process.  Consid-
er, again, the litigation that culminated in NFIB v. Sebelius.  There, the 
federal district court (ten months after suit was filed) rendered a de-
cision on January 31, 2011, and the court of appeals issued its deci-
sion on August 12 of that year.  The Supreme Court promptly grant-
ed certiorari, ordered briefing and held oral arguments, and issued 
its decision on June 28, 2012.153  Granted, the individual mandate 
provision of the ACA was not due to go into effect until January 1, 
2014, so the federal judges were not under extreme time pressures.  
Presumably the Supreme Court could have granted certiorari before 
judgment in the court of appeals154 or taken other steps to hasten the 
final disposition, if that had been necessary.  But the timeline of NFIB 
v. Sebelius does suggest that expediting mandates found in statutes are 
usually not necessary.155 
While expediting a particular case, direct review may place un-
comfortable demands on docket management by the Supreme Court. 
During the heyday of the three-judge district court, when such ap-
peals were inundating the Court’s docket, some suggested that these 
appeals were forcing the hand of the Court.156  That is, the Court 
could not simply grant or deny certiorari; instead, it needed to osten-
sibly decide the case on the merits.157  The Court responded by decid-
 
152 Douglas, supra note 70, at 459.  The conclusion is based on a review of the three-judge 
district court decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court from 2000 to 2009.  Id. at 459–62. 
153 For a listing of the decisions of the three courts, see supra note 5. 
154 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012) (“Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Su-
preme Court by . . . writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or 
criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . . . .”). 
155 In this regard, consider the extensive litigation which challenged on constitutional and 
statutory grounds other aspects of the ACA.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A New Wave of Chal-
lenges to Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2013, at A1 (discussing some of these challenges).  
For example, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius, there was a “flood of lawsuits” 
challenging, on First Amendment free exercise grounds and under the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq., another provision (and its implement-
ing regulations) of the ACA requiring employers to cover birth control in employee 
health plans.  See Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits on the Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 27, 2013, at A1.  That litigation culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bur-
well v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), rendered only two years after Sebe-
lius. 
156 See Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 42, at 105 (“Another commentator has 
argued that direct review ‘forc[es] the hand of the Supreme Court without benefit of pri-
or appellate review.’”(citation omitted)). 
157 In its most recent BCRA decision, the Court made the point strongly, observing that on a 
direct appeal, it had “‘no discretion to refuse adjudication of the case on its merits.’” 
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ing a significant percentage of those cases after full briefing and oral 
argument, and the rest by the awkward practice of a one-sentence 
summary affirmance, or occasionally a summary reversal.  The latter 
were ostensibly on the merits, but came to be seen as possessing no 
precedential authority.  Thus, it was near the functional equivalent of 
a denial of certiorari.158 
To be sure, the statutory diminution of the three-judge district 
court in 1976 and the demise of most other direct appeals by 1988,159 
coupled with the Court’s current shrunken docket,160 have lessened 
caseload pressures on the Court.  In light of these developments, the 
demands of special review provisions with direct appeals are less of a 
burden on the Court.  Granting that, the current direct appeals may 
still place cases before the Court at inopportune times, before it is 
ready to confront the issues.161  Consider here again the continuing 
stream of cases on direct appeal challenging various provisions of the 
BCRA.162  In Citizens United, the Court majority reserved the question 
of whether its holding extended to political contributions by foreign-
ers.163   Some observers argued that any restriction of such spending 
by foreigners was at odds with the balance of the analysis of the ma-
jority.164  A challenge to the BCRA on that ground was promptly 
brought, and the lower court held that the BCRA could constitution-
ally limit spending by foreign contributors.165  Rather than fully ex-
ploring this potentially important issue, upon a direct appeal, the 
Court summarily affirmed.166  Thus, it utilized an old-fashioned safety-
 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 
332, 344 (1975)). 
158 See Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 42, at 107–09 (“Still, the current manner 
of disposing of putatively mandatory appeals is not without its costs, which are similar to 
those attending the certiorari process.”). 
159 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
160 See generally Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Dock-
et, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012).  
161 Cf. David Fontana, Docket Control and the Success of Constitutional Courts, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624, 624 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (“[C]ourts 
deciding constitutional cases benefit from having the power to set their agenda . . . .”) 
162 See supra note 52.  At one point I referred to these cases as causing the Court “BCRA-
fatigue.”  Solimine, Institutional, supra note 42, at 779. 
163 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2009). 
164 E.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 
605–10 (2011) (discussing foreign spending). 
165 Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d  281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court). 
166 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).  Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press 
Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 415-16 & n.12 (2013) (stating that the Citizens United  opin-
ion is “overly long and unfocused.  It seems to stretch for unnecessarily broad interpreta-
tions of free speech law . . . . Already the Court has been forced to cut back on one of the 
broader possible implications . . . .”) (citing the summary affirmance in Bluman). 
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valve to avoid confronting a potentially difficult case.  Absent the di-
rect appeal, it may have waited until one or more courts of appeal 
decisions had been rendered before resolving the issue. 
C.  Reconsidering the Constitutional Doubt Canon 
In their new treatise on statutory interpretation quoted at the be-
ginning of this article, Justice Scalia and Professor Garner critically 
examine the venerable canon that federal statutes should, if neces-
sary, be construed to avoid a reading that would render them uncon-
stitutional.  As they observe, this canon of statutory construction is 
premised on a “genuine assessment of probable meaning” on behalf 
of Congress.167  The legislature presumably only wishes to enact lawful 
statutes, so it should not be “presumed to be sailing close to the wind, 
so to speak—entering an area of questionable constitutionality with-
out making that entrance utterly clear.”168  Justice Scalia and Professor 
Garner continue that the presumption may not be justified today.  
Congress does sail close to the wind “all the time[,]” and the “ques-
tionable constitutionality” is evidenced and indeed acknowledged, 
they say, by Congress through the presence of special review provi-
sions in statutes.169  Despite this criticism, Justice Scalia and Professor 
Garner ultimately conclude that the constitutional doubt canon 
should continue to be supported.170 
Despite their ultimate reticence, a plausible inference of Justice 
Scalia and Professor Garner’s view of the special review provisions is 
that the canon should not hold, or perhaps should even be reversed, 
when a statute under constitutional attack contains such a provi-
sion.171  A full discussion of the considerable debate over the canon is 
beyond the scope of this Article.172 What is worth addressing here is 
 
167 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 248. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 249.  They argue that “ [a] more plausible basis for the rule is that it represents ju-
dicial policy” to minimize “judicial conflicts with the legislature.” Id. 
171 In an earlier reference to these provisions, Justice Scalia stated that “‘if Congress is going 
to take the attitude that it will do anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court 
worry about the Constitution,’ then ’perhaps th[e] presumption [that acts of Congress 
are constitutional] is unwarranted.’”  Devins, supra note 92, at 280 n.69 (quoting Stuart 
Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, 32 NAT’L J. 1810, 1811 (2000) available at 
http://nationaljournal.com/magazine/judiciary-the-tipping-point-20000610). 
172 For articles discussing the debate over the canon, see, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. 
Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM  L. 
REV. 1715 (2013); John Copeland Nagle, Deleware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1495 (1997); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71; Adrian 
Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional 
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whether Scalia and Garner are correct to identify the special review 
provisions as signals of the alleged constitutional questionability of 
federal statutes. 
In my view, Justice Scalia and Professor Garner give too much 
weight to the presence of special review provisions in particular stat-
utes.  It is true, as they point out, that many of the statutes with such 
provisions have been later held to be unconstitutional, in whole or in 
part, by the Supreme Court.173  But the Court has not held all such 
statutes to be unconstitutional,174 and others have been resolved by 
the Supreme Court on other grounds.175  While the number of such 
statutes is not trivial, or most do not deal with trivial matters,176 the 
sample size is relatively small to draw definitive conclusions about 
congressional signaling.  Moreover, the rate of unconstitutionality of 
such statutes cannot be said to be strikingly different from that of all 
considerations of the constitutionality of federal statutes by the 
Court.  Recent studies indicate that throughout American history, the 
Court has considered the constitutionality of a federal statute about 
792 times, and struck down the statute 173 times, or about 22% of the 
time.177 This is not a robust rate of unconstitutionality, showing Con-
 
Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 
(2000); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the In-
side—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 947–48 (2013) (discussing survey of congressional staffers tasked with 
drafting legislation which found that most were unaware of the constitutional avoidance 
canon, but most also anticipated that the courts would rule on the constitutionality of 
statutes).  For an analysis of Scalia and Garner’s treatment of the constitutional avoidance 
canon in their treatise, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Can-
ons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 543, 569 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)).  None of these 
sources specifically address what interpretive weight, if any, courts should give to the 
presence or absence of special review provisions. 
173 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 248–49 nn. 7–9 (giving examples of statutes declared 
unconstitutional).  They do not cite instances of such statutes being upheld.  See id. 
174 See, e.g., the initial adjudication of the BCRA, supra note 51, and the adjudications of the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Decency Act, supra note 56, of the census re-
form legislation, supra note 61, and of the REAL ID Act, supra note 63. 
175 In several instances the Court has declined to review lower court decisions upholding 
statutes with special review provisions.  For examples, see supra notes 62, 65, & 66.  In the 
litigation over the census reform legislation, the majority of the Court (perhaps ironical-
ly) employed the constitutional doubt canon to resolve the case on non-constitutional 
grounds. See supra note 6. 
176 Some might include the Saxbe Fix statutes in the category of trivia, but the BCRA and 
many of the other statutes clearly do not fall into that category. 
177 Jenna Becker Kane & David Adamany, Judicial Activism Once Again Reconsidered, 21 TABLE 3 
(2013) (presenting data from Marshall through Roberts Courts) (paper presented at an-
nual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 11–14, 2013, Chicago, 
Ill.)(on file with author). 
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gress sailing close to the wind.  But the rate is much higher for recent 
decades.  In the Warren through Roberts Courts, the numbers and 
rate are 247, 104, and 42%, respectively.178  The rate of unconstitu-
tionality is higher than that for the recent statutes with the special re-
view provisions, and the difference is accentuated by the fact that the 
overall figures include the adjudications involving the latter statues.  
Nonetheless, it cannot be said the finding of unconstitutionality is a 
rare event, with the latter statutes being a conspicuous exception. 
The overall context of the passage of statutes with special review 
provisions also undercuts Justice Scalia and Professor Garner’s posi-
tion.  As I earlier argued,179 a richer and more realistic appraisal of 
the reasons Congress passes these provisions suggests that it is not 
merely indicative of Congress mindlessly sailing close to the wind.  In-
stead, a confluence of rational and practical reasons, similar to that 
which attends the passage of most legislation, explains why Congress 
included the special review provisions.  I do not find these reasons to 
be especially convincing as a matter of policy, and I ultimately con-
cluded that their possibly negative effects on decision-making by low-
er federal courts and the Supreme Court180 suggest that Congress 
should not utilize these provisions.  Nonetheless, these criticisms do 
not support the strong version of the argument that the special re-
view provisions are unambiguous signals of probable unconstitution-
ality to the federal courts.  Rather, the rationales and effects of the 
provisions are on the whole ambiguous, so federal courts should be 
hesitant to draw interpretive conclusions from their presence or ab-
sence in particular statutes. 
D.  Summing Up 
The conventional critique of the special review provisions con-
tends that they are examples of Congress abdicating its responsibility 
to take seriously the constitutional validity of statutes it passes.  This 
critique is incomplete.  While it is true that Congress in recent dec-
ades has, by traditional measures, devoted less attention to the consti-
tutional status of statutes it considers and may enact, it does not fol-
low that the special review provisions are especially problematic 
examples of that tendency.  Congressional motivation can be multi-
farious when it comes to any statute, and in my view the legislative 
record on these provisions is no different.  Congressional abdication 
 
178 Id. 
179 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
180 See supra Part IV.B. 
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of constitutional responsibility may play a part, but the provisions can 
also be conceptualized as Congress taking those responsibilities seri-
ously for that particular statute, by inviting the federal courts (and of-
ten the most prestigious lower court) to rule quickly on the constitu-
tional issues. 
Despite this somewhat more benign view of the legislative purpose 
of the special review provisions, I still conclude that they are not 
sound additions to the institutional structure of federal courts.  There 
are several aspects of their effect on federal court decision-making 
that is troublesome.  These include the lack of percolation, the un-
necessary directives for rapid decisions, and the unnecessary exclusive 
venue often placed in the federal court for the District of Columbia.  
These negative effects on the judicial decision-making process out-
weigh the modest, possibly positive impact the provisions have on a 
dialogue between Congress and the federal courts.  The normal fed-
eral court process to determine the constitutionality of federal stat-
utes is up to the task, and the special review provisions are unneces-
sary. 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1803 the federal courts have possessed the authority to con-
sider the constitutionality of federal statutes.  For most years since 
1891, that sort of litigation, and most other litigation as well, has tak-
en place within the now familiar three-tier process, of a trial court de-
cision by a single judge, followed by a right of appeal to a three-judge 
panel on a regional court of appeals (sometimes augmented by en 
banc review), followed (since 1925) by discretionary review in the Su-
preme Court.  Congress experimented with a different approach 
from 1937 to 1976, with three-judge district courts being convened to 
hear constitutional challenges to a federal statute, followed by a di-
rect appeal to the Supreme Court.  After critics, including Justices on 
the Court itself, pointed to administrative burdens and the arguable 
lack of reason for this different process, Congress repealed the exper-
iment. 
However, since the abandonment of the standing (if temporarily 
convened) three-judge district court, Congress has seen fit to place 
similar provisions in a number of particular federal statutes.  They are 
similar but not identical to the prior experiment, and to each other, 
but the new provisions typically also mandate that the suit be brought 
in the District Court for the District of Columbia, that members of 
Congress can bring or intervene in such suits, and that federal judges 
should expeditiously decide the cases.  The ostensible reasons for 
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these provisions are doubts about the constitutionality of the statutes, 
and a perceived need to quickly decide such cases and resolve consti-
tutional questions about a statute.  These are the new specialized (al-
beit temporarily-convened) federal constitutional courts. 
There is nothing sacred about our current federal judicial archi-
tecture, but any significant deviation should, in my view, be justified.  
There are not convincing justifications for these specialized constitu-
tional courts.  I do not take the view of some critics that they are un-
qualified evidence of the constitutional weakness of a particular stat-
ute, or of abdication by Congress of its responsibility to seriously 
consider the constitutionality of legislation it enacts.  Other, more 
mundane reasons may account for the proliferation of these provi-
sions.  However, I conclude that the provisions are on balance un-
necessary and in some ways may be harmful to the consideration of 
these important constitutional issues, by, among other things, poten-
tially depriving the Supreme Court of the percolation of views by 
more than one lower federal court. 
The best path, then, would be for Congress not to further enact 
these provisions.  Should it insist on doing so, however, Congress 
should draft them in different ways.  It should replicate more closely 
the experiment from 1937 to 1976 which, for all of its infirmities, 
cannot be said to have been a disaster.  Members of Congress can do 
so by placing these provisions in the bills originally introduced, rather 
than adding them, as they often are, in last-minute final votes on the 
floor of Congress.  This would serve the salutary purposes of alerting 
the rest of the Congress that there may indeed be special constitu-
tional issues with that particular statute, and permitting discussion of 
the necessity of the special review provisions themselves.181  Likewise, 
there is no need to place exclusive jurisdiction in the District of Co-
lumbia or of formally mandating expeditious treatment.  The former 
inappropriately elevates the importance of federal courts in the Dis-
trict, and the latter is unnecessary, as experience shows that federal 
judges can, when requested and when necessary, rapidly decide cases.  
These would be sounder attributes of specialized federal constitu-
tional courts. 
 
 
181 Cf. Hanah Metchis Volokh, Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
173, 214–15 (2013) (arguing that constitutional authority statements should be required 
at earlier and multiple times in the legislative process, to have desired effect on congres-
sional deliberation). 
